Coventry Wm

Englands Appeal,

FROM THE

PRIVATE CABALLE

AT

WHITEHALL

TO

The Great Council of the Nation;

The Lords and Commons

IN

PARLIAMENT

ASSEMBLED.

By a true Lover of his Country.

Anno 1673.

Phædrus Lib. 1. Fab. V.

Nunquam est fidelis cum potente societas.
Testatur hæc fabella Propositum meum.

VAcca & Capella et patiens Ovis injuriæ,
Socij fuere cum Leone in saltibus.
Hi cum cepissent Cervum vasti corporis;
Sic est Locutus, partibus factis, Leo:
Ego primam tollo nominor quia Leo:
Secundam, quia sum fortis tribuetis mihi.
Tum quia plus valeo, me sequetur teria,
Malo adficietur, si quis quartum tetigerit,
Sic totam prædam Sola Improbitas abstulit.

Anglice,

ENgland! this fable plainly Shew's,
A strong Allie no Partner know's

THe *BULL* the *GOAT*, and Patient *SHEEP* one day,
Leagu'd with the LYON, sought a Common prey;
A Prey they took, an high and mighty Hart;
Of which each thought to have his equal part:
Soft, quoth the Lyon, I the first share claim;
'Cause LYON King o'th Forrest is my name;
The second you shall give me as my due,
'Cause I am valiant, able to subdue:
The third, I take by force, and for the rest,
Touch it, who dar's, yield it all, you had best.

THis is an Age of wonders: And if with a conſidering eye we take a careful view of Europe, we ſhall find that ſome years laſt paſt have preſented us with as many things worthy of admiration as any former age hath afforded to our forefathers. The Revolution of *Portugal*, and the wonderful ſecrecy with which it was carried on, is not to be matched in any Age. The Tragy-Comedy of *Maſſanello* looks more like a Poetical fiction then a real truth. The Depoſing of Kings, and (which is much more ſtrange) their Voluntary reſignation (of which the Annals of Antient times furniſh us, but with very few examples) are become the common Theame of our Journals, and if from the reſt of Europe we turn our eyes toward this Iſland, our ſurpriſal will increaſe and we ſhall find that this little Brittiſh world is a ſmall Enchiridion, or Epitome of all the ſtupendious events that ever hapned in the great one. We have all ſeen or had a ſhare in thoſe paſſages which Poſteriry will hardly give more credit to, then we do to what is ſaid of King *Arthurs* Round Table. And tis not improbable that ſome hundred years hence the Hiſtory of our late revolutions will be ranked among the fabulous Romances of *Gildas* and ſuch other writers.

But it may be among all our unexpected changes, Revolutions, and Counſells, there is ſcarce any more juſtly to be wondred at, then the preſent Aliance with *France*, and the warr we have undertaken, and do ſtill perſiſt to proſecute againſt *Holland*, in ſo dangerous an aſſociation with the French. It was undoubtedly above the reach of an ordinary underſtanding to imagine or ſuſpect (in the leaſt) that a Proteſtant Kingdome, without being compelled to it by ſome urgent and unavoydable neceſſity, ſhould ever fight with ſo much fierceneſs for the deſtruction of the Proteſtant intereſt: or that Engliſh Councellors ſhould adviſe his Maieſty to run the fortune of a French King without a rational proſpect of advantage to himſelf Would any man that judgeth of

things

things according to the ordinary rules of prudence, have thought that in order to the making good our Title to the Kingdom of France, we should able their present King to invade all Christendome and to extend his Empire without bounds, or that to secure to our selves the soveraignty of the Seas, we should with so much industry endeavour to force all the *Dutch Ships*, with all their Naval power into the *French* Armes, and rejoyce at their victories, as if by conquering the land they did not master at the same time their Havens, their Rivers, and their Fleets? We have been often told of brisk messages sent formerly to the *French* Kings, as soon as they did but lay the Carckase of some pittiful Ship upon the Rocks, But we did never so much as dream that Vice Admiralls, and other considerable sea Officers should be sent to the *French* Court to encourage and promote the setting out of their Fleeets: That pitying their want of experience in Sea affaires, we would out of a compassionate and brotherly love lead their raw Sea-men by the hand, train them up in our Fleets, and amongst the best of our Sea men, teach them what skill we have learnt in a long and dear bought experience, And to crown all, even fight for them, and interpose between them and danger and with so good succes (as it proved) that the *French* Squadron (as if the ingagement had been only designed for an entertainment and diversion to them) came off as fresh and as whole as when they first sayled out of their Ports. The surprising novelty and strangeness of these unexpected Councils hath occasioned the following reflections, And all men being equally concerned in the preservation of the Ship they sayle in, though all do not sit at the Helm, it is every ones duty as well as their undoubted right to prevent as much as they are able, a fatal running upon Rocks, which may chance not to be discerned by others, upon this just and well grounded confidence, I presume to direct these papers to the great Counsel of the Nation, humbly begging that they may be read with an unbyassed mind, and truth weighed in the ballance of the sanctuary. Before all I must premise I do not intend to write an Apology for the Dutch, nor to justifie all their proceedings, much less to increase the number of the Scurrulous Pamphlets against them, which I am confident will affect no sober man in the Nation, and need only to be read to be confuted, I'le onely say that since all Christians should above all things enquire into the justice of their Arms before they either take them up, or refuse to lay them down. It will become the wisdoms and prudence of both houses to hear what the *Dutch*

may

may say for themselves, and to take into their serious consideration the protestations they make both in publick and in private, of their unfeigned desires as well as readiness to give *England* all possible satisfaction, and buy his Majesties Friendship at a more then ordinary rate.

But my present designe being not to enter further into these particulars nor to examine the Justice or injustice of this Warr, but rather to consider and querie (supposing it had been never so just at first) how farr it may be advisible to continue it, I will with as much clearenes as I am able, and in as few words as the matter will bear, confine my self to these following heads.

1. *A Short account of the Crown with which his Majesty is entred into League.*
2. *The necessity, and unavoydable consequences of this Warr.*
3. *Some general reflections upon the whole*, with some Account *of the manner and steps by which this Warr was both promoted and begun.*

1. All those who are not altogether strangers to the world will easily grant that of al the Kingdoms of Europe there are none but may be said inferiour to *France* in some respect or other, and to want some advantages which *France* enjoyeth in a very eminent degree, The greatness of its Territories, The Populousnes of it, the number of their Gentry and Nobility. Their natural courage; together with the advantage of being trained up either to Military actions or to Warlike exercises, ever since the foundation of their Monarchy, the scituation of their Country, and the oppertunities they have by it to anoy their neighbours upon all occasions, The fruitfulnes and riches of the soyle, together with the prodigious quantity of all sorts of commodities manufactured & unmanifactured with which they supply their neighbours, And lastly the great revenues of their Kings, who governing of late without controul or check, are so much the more able to oppress their neighbours; All these advantages meeting together, they have in all ages had aspiring thoughts, and under *Charlemaine* had erected a new Western Empire, which in all likelyhood would have proved of longer continuation, had not those great Dominions been shared and divided between the said *Charlemaines* Children, which in the succeeding Ages proved an occasion of many great and bloody Warrs.

2. A Second and memorable ſtop to the encreaſe of the *French* was, when by the ambition of *Hugh Capett* who aymed at the Crown, to uſurpe it with leſs oppoſition, and to draw the Grandees into his party, he made all their governments hereditary and erected them into a kind of Principalitys held in *Capite*, from thence ſprang ſo many great Famylies able afterwards to wage Warr againſt the *French* King. And whilſt they were thus in a kind of Minority, the Houſe of *Burgundy* having joyned with *England*, brought that Kingdome to the Low condition, every one knows.

Lewis the 11th. was the firſt who after the *Engliſh* had loſt not only their new Conqueſt, but alſo what they had poſſeſſed of old in *France*, raiſed the *French* Crown to a greater height, and his Son *Charles* the 8th. beſides the acquiſition of *Brittany*, frighted all Europe by his ſurpriſeing conqueſt of the Kingdom of Naples.

This occaſioned a general confederacy of all neighbouring Princes againſt him, whereby he ſoon loſt what he had gotten, But ſtill the ambitious thoughts of his Succeſſors would have much endangred the liberty of Europe, if the *Auſtrian* family (raiſed on a ſudden to a vaſt Grandeur by the occaſion of an innumerable number of Provinces united in *Charles* the 5th.) had not carried the Imperial Crown from *Francis* the 1ſt. who ſtood with much Eagerneſs for it, and had already engaged ſeveral of the Electors.

This haveing over ballanced the *French* power, the ſaid *Francis* the 1. though helpd ſeveral times by the great *Solyman* Emperour of the *Turks*, was at laſt forced to yeild to the victorious Armes of *Charles* the 5th. who took him priſoner and forced him to buy his liberty with a very diſadvantageous peace.

But his Son *Henry* the ſecond had better ſucceſs, and amongſt other advantages he added to his Dominions three very fair Imperial and Epiſcopal Towns, and was likely to have gon further had he not been prevented by a ſudden death, *England* all this while (true at that time to their own intereſt) with a skilliful hand holding the ballance and keeping the conteſting parties in as great an equality as their own occaſions would permit.

Under the minority of his Children, the bloody Maſſacres and civil warrs, began, which laſted forty years, and would have put an end to that Monarchy if the Ambition of *Phillip* the ſecond would have given way to the dividing of it into the ſeveral Principalities, which the reſpective Grandees aymed at.

But

But *Henry* the 4th. strengthened by the divisions which grew between the *Spaniards* and the holy League, having won many Battailes, made his Title to the Crown good, by the success of his Armes and not long after concluded peace with *Spain* to gain time to breath and to recover new strength.

No sooner was he at rest, but he bent all his thoughts upon a project as vast in the designe of it, as Extraordinary in its nature, intending no less then to cast Europe into a new Mould and to reduce all the Kingdoms, and Common Wealths, that were in his time to a certain number, and to bring them within such bounds as he should prescribe to them, being sure however in this Marshalling to take such share to himself as would have enabled him (or at least his successors) to grow into an universal Monarch.

To effect this he had already made choyce of his Generals and other great Officers, and was preparing both Arms and Money when a sudden and unexpected death put an end as well to his undertaking as to his life.

The beginning and in truth the greatest part of the Reign of *Lewis* the 13th. his Son was much disquieted by intestine broyles and Civil Warrs, during which the house of *Austria* was very neer bringing all *Germany* under their subjection, and after the Battel of *Prague* stood very fair for the universal Empire, But *France* having at last quieted all at home, did (under the pretence of opposing the *Austrian* Family, and whilst they were courted by several Princes to assist and protect them against the Emperour) vastly encrease their own power, and conquered new Provinces, and considerable Towns in *Spain*, *Italy*, *Germany*, and the *Low Countryes*, which raising a new jealousie in their own Allyes occasioned the peace of *Munster* to prevent their further progress.

About the same time the new Civil Warrs which broke out in *France* under the menority of the present King gave oportunity to *Spain* ro recover part of their Losses, till the (late) Protector of *England* joyning with the *French* (for the advancement of some private ends of his own, & by a policy from which the destruction of Europe may chance to take it's date before we are much older) brought them into a decaying condition, and made the *Pyrenean* Peace (after the death of *Cromwell*) most wellcome to them.

Before we go further and come to give a more particular account of the

the present *French* Court, I will beg leave to stop here a while And desire the reader to take along the following inferences, from what hath already been hinted, a more full knowledge thereof being left to the perusal of their Histories.

1. That no greater proofs can be given of the internal strength of the *French* Nation, then their overcoming the many dangerous convulsions of state, they have from time to time strugled, with which in all appearance would have destroyed any other Nation.

2. That in all Ages, assoon as their intestine troubles have been over, they have still out of a restless and Warlike humour endeavoured to encroach upon their neighbours and to encrease their own Dominions laying hold of all opertunitys to disturb man-kind and having never been able as yet to set bounds to their Ambition.

3. That this Ambitious humour of theirs, supported by the greatness of their power would long before this time have brought all Europe under their subjection, if their own divisions and private quarrels had not from time, to time, put back their designes for many years, or their greatest Princes been cut off before they could finish their intended work.

4. And Lastly as a consequence of the three former, that it was ever, and will be still, the true interest of Europe to oppose the *French* designs, or if there be any occasion of making use of them against some other oppressors, not to accept of their assistance, longer or further then publick utility requires it, nor to suffer them to proceed after the danger is over, as it was practiced in the peace of *Passaw*, in the time of *Henry* the 2. and that of *Munster*, in both which the *French* were stopped in their full carreere by their own Allyes, though they still came off with profit.

The *French* having thus in the last Warrs, added many fair Provinces, and Towns to their Teritories; this present Court had no sooner made Peace with *Spain*, but they thought of laying the foundations of a vaster Empire then ever, And perceiving that since the discovery of the *Indies*, and increase of Trade, Naval strength was the most important of all others, and Navigation and commerce the greatest (if not the only) supporters of it, They first erected and encouraged several Trading Companies, and in the second place they spared no cost and stuck at no charge or expence, to purchase a considerable Fleet of men of Warr wherein they have been so successful, That I fear their

Fleet

Fleet (excepting the true courage of our Sea-men) is not much inferiour to that of his Majesties, as incredible as it may seem at first, considering how few years they have applied themselves to it.

But whilst they were thus intent upon the increase of their interest at Sea, they let no oppertunity slip, of enlarging their Empire at Land, for during the late Warr with *Holland*, they invaded in (1667.) and mastered a considerable part of the *Spanish-Low-Countries* in 1669. they hunted the poor Duke of *Lorriane* out of his Dutchy, and to this day possess it all and now this last year they have conquered halfe the United Provinces, Much less then all this was more then sufficient to awaken all Europe; and his Majesty above all others being out of his Princely wisdome very sensible that the keeping a true ballence between the Princes and other states of Europe, was the onely security of all, and that by a timely stop to the *French* conquests he would reape an infinite honour and profit. Assoon as the *French* King fell upon *Flanders*, he begun to think of applying fitt remedies to so dangerous a disease, and having concluded a Peace at *Breda* with the *Hollanders*, he sent to them in private in *January* 1668. Sir *William Temple*, who was then his Resident at *Brussells*, to propose a neerer Allyance with them, and to take joynt measures against the *French*.

" No small Argument by the way, of his Majesties aversion to the " *French* designes, and of the fear he had of their increase, since to " prevent it, he went so farr as to seek the *Hollanders* first, and to pro- " pose stricter Alliances with them after so fierce and Resent a Warr ene- " ded with the unpleasant circumstances of *Chatham*.

Sir William Temples propositions having been entertained with all ready complyance by the *Dutch*, he waited on his Majesty to give him an account of his Negociation, And within five days after he was sent back to the *Hague* with all necessary powers and instructions, by vertue of and inconformity to which he concluded and agreed upon, two several Treaties with the *Dutch*, the one a defensive and stricter League than before between the two Nations; And the other a joynt and recipocal engagement, to oppose the conquest of *Flanders*, and to procure either by way of Mediation or by force of Armes, a speedy peace between *France* & *Spain*, upon the Terms therein mentioned, & becaus *Sweden* came unto the same Treaty very little after, from the three parties concerned

o ucerned, and engaged, it was called the Triple League. In perſuance of this, the Treaty of *Aix la Chapel* was forced upon the *French*, and in ſome manner upon the *Spaniards*, who were very unwilling to give away by a ſolemn Treaty ſo great a part of their Country. But both his Majeſty and the *Hollanders* thought it a very great and good work, and judged it a great happineſs not only for *Spain*, but for all Europe to come off with a broken Pate, and to have at leaſt for that while kept *France* from going further.

This was repreſented to the Parliment with all the advantages of Language, and nothing was omitted in the reſpective ſpeeches of his Majeſty himſe f, the Lord *Keeper*, and many private Members, that could make both Houſes (and with them the whole Kingdome) ſenſible of the great ſervice done to *England*, and in a manner to all mankind by chaining up a devouring *Lyon*, who was never ſatiated with prey.

This Triple League grew ſo famous that it proved the politick Inſtitute of our Juſtinian. In the name of the Triple League, and of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapel*, ſeveral ſubſidies were both demanded & granted, for 2. or 3. S ſſions together, The Triple League ſtoped or anulled al Inpeachments: for its ſake inquiries into miſcarriages were laid aſide. And the Parliament did conceive they could neither give nor forgive too much, if by their complyance they could but contribute ſome what towards binding the *French* to their good behaviour.

Beſides this, to tie the Knot faſter, and take even the very thoughts from the *French* King, of ever ſtirring, or being troubleſome to his neighbours, his Majeſty ſent an Extraordinary Envoy to ſeveral Princes of *Germany*, to invite them into the Triple League: His Miniſter to perſwade them to it, laying open, with no leſs heate than plainefs, the danger all Europe was in, The inſenſibility of moſt Princes, and their careleſneſs, The watchful ambition of the *French*, the greatneſs of their forces, And the little reaſon one had to truſt them. In fine, omitting nothing that could Alarme all the world, and procure a general confederacy againſt the common oppreſſor; Nay, to evince and demonſtrate (beſides all we have ſaid now) that this Triple League was not entred into out of a particular reſpect, or perſonal kindneſs to the *Spaniard* (not to ſpeake now of the miſunderſtanding and Jarring between *England* and *Spain* in the Weſt *Indies*) the ſaid *Spaniards* being very much wanting to themſelves, by their backwardneſs in the payment of the ſubſidies promiſed to *Sweden*. His Majeſty not to be wanting to

Europe,

Europe, and consequently to his own Kingdoms, out of the deep sense he had of the necessity of preserving the Triple-League entire, and being not without feares, the *Swedes* might fall off, unless the Money agreed upon was paid them, without further delay; he offered in *September* or *October* 1668. to advance himself part of it, and had accordingly done it in case the *Dutch* would have advanced the rest.

All this doth abundantly shew what opinion his Majesty and his Councel were used to have of *France* as well as both Houses, and the rest of Nation: And therefore without considering how things came to the be altered (which we may take hereafter some notice of) we may lay down as an Undeniable *English* Principle, and a Maxime never to be swerved from: That *France* is no waies to be suffered to grow great, much less to have their designes promoted, as it is plain to all mankind they are now.

But we must go somewhat further, and there being nothing more dangerous then to joyn in any ambitious designe with a Prince against whom we can no waies secure our selves, in case he break his word to us, it will not be amiss to consider how far one may rely upon the Candor and integrity of the *French Court*, and what may rationally be expected from their generosity.

In Order to this, since the heart of man is not known otherwise then by a careful observation of their Actions, and that we cannot judge of things to come but by Inferances and Arguments drawn from those that are past; the best way to satisfy our selves is to take a short surveigh of the carriage and conduct of the *French Court* for these last 13. Years, during which they have had still the same Ministers, who are not like to Act henceforth upon any other Principles, or by other Methods then they have done hitherto, and they having been brought up in so good a School as that of *Cardinal Mazareen* whose motto was that An honest man ought not to be a slave to his word, it must not be wondered at, if they do still as much as they are able, influence their present Master and endeavour to perswade him that.

Si Violandum est jus, Regnandi causa Violandum est.

The first proof of the honesty both of the *Cardinal* himself, and of his *Disciples*, is their Cariage in the *Pirenean* Treaty & their performance of what was most Essential in it, wherein is to be observed that.

By the endeavours of the *Queen Mother* of *France*, a peace being promoted between the two Crowns, with a Marriage between the

French King and the *Infanta* of *Spain*, the whole Treaty was grounded upon two considerable points, which till granted by *France*, had still hindred the conclusion of that great work, the one, was the forsaking of *Portugal*, and the other a renunciation of the *Infanta*, (consented to and ratified by the *French King*) of all her present and future Pretences, Titles or Claimes whatsoever to the *Spanish Monarchy* and *Dominions* thereof, or to any part of the same: "Least, saith the 'Treaty, The Glory of their respected Kingdoms should come to decay, 'and be diminished if by reason and through the said Marriage they 'came to be united and joyned, in any of their Children, and Posteri-'ty, which would occasion to the Subjects and Vassalls, such troubles 'and afflictions as might easily be imagined.

'As to the first, *viz.* the exclusion and forsaking of *Portugal*. The 'words of the Treaty are these, His said Majesty (the *French King*) will 'intermedle no further in the said Business, and doth promise and ob-'liege himself upon his honour, upon & the faith & word of a King, both 'for himself and his successors, not to give, neither in common nor to 'any Person or Persons thereof in Particular of what Dignity, Estate 'or Condition soever, either at present or for the future, any help or 'assistance, neither publick nor secret, directly not indirectly, of men, 'Arms, Munitions, Victualling, Vessells nor money, under any pre-'tence, nor any other thing whatsoever, by Land or by Sea, nor in any 'other manner, as likewise not to suffer any Levies to be made in any 'part of his Kingdoms, and Dominions nor to grant a passage to any 'that might come from other Countries to the Relief of the said King-'dom of *Portugal*.

I suppose all the World will grant, it were hard for the wit of man, to find out, or so much as imagine stronger words, or fuller expressions in a Treaty, to prevent what the *Spaniards* were so much afraid of, *viz.* the Assistance of *Portugal*, Let us now see how it was performed.

As soon as this was agreed on, and before the Treaty was signed Cardinal *Mazarin* (still resolved as well in this as upon all other occasions, not to be *Eschave De sa parolle*) sent privately the Marquis the *Chonpes* into *Portugal*, to assure them that in Order to the conclusion of the Treaty then on foot with *Spain*, they were forced to leave them out, and to engage not to assist them: but that whatever they promised they would never forsake them, and would still

ſtill protect them againſt *Spaine* as much as they had done before. The truth is, they kept their word to *Portugal*, much better then they did to *Spain*. And the Peace was no ſooner made, but they ſent them the uſual ſupplies of Men, Arms and Money, And a while after notwithſtanding their former Treaty with *Spain*, and in the view of the whole world, they entred into an Offenſive League with that Kingdome againſt all their Enemies, whereby, amongſt other things, the *French* were to have all the Sea-Towns that ſhould be taken from *Spain* delivered to them, All which with many other perticulars, too long to be inſerted in this ſhort diſcourſe, may be ſeen more at large, in the incomparable Books of the *Baron de l'Iſola*; intituled the Buckler of State and Juſtice which to this day could not be anſwered by the *French*, though often challenged (and ſo much concerned in honour) to do it.

The other ſecurity of the *Pireneau* Treaty as to *Spain*, and that without which they could never have given their conſent to their Marriage of the *Infanta*, was the Renunciation before mentioned, And whoever reads it will be ape to think, a General Councel of the *Civilians* was called, to outdo all former Expreſſions uſed in ſuch contracts, and to find out new binding Clauſes, to take of all poſſibility of Evaſion. And to make it more ſacred yet and more inviolable, There being no greater tie upon Soveraign Princes then that of Publique and ſolemn Treaties, the Act of the Renunciation was incorporated into the very Treaty of Peace, to make up of both of them but one body; though digeſted unto different Inſtruments as is expreſly declared in the 33. Article of the Treaty of Peace, wherein ſpeaking of the Contract of Marriage, to which they referr themſelves, theſe words are added, which though it be ſeperated hath the ſame force and vigour with the preſent Treaty of Peace, as being the principal part thereof, and the moſt precious pawn of its greater ſecurity and laſting.

But the *French Lawyers* preferring the little quirks of Law before publique faith; And pretending they might bring the Authority of ſolemn Treaties (which are the true, and indeed the only Law between Soveraign Princes) under the Cavil of *Municipal Laws*, and Local Cuſtoms, endeavouring to perſwade the World that their Maſter was not bound to ſtand to what he had ſo ſolemnly promiſed and confirmed by ſacred Oaths: And the French King after the death of the late King of *Spain*, claimed (notwithſtanding the ſaid Re-

 nunciation)

renunciation) a great part of the *Spaniſh Low-Countries*, as being devolved to him in right of his Wife, by the *Municipal Laws* of thoſe Countries; And to back his unexpected Claime with more effectual meanes, he Invaded the Country with a powerful Army.

This Invaſion, ſo contrary to his Engagements, and ſo deſtructive to the very eſſence of the *Pirenean Treaty*, was attended with ſome circumſtances, no leſs ſurpriſing than the breach it ſelf.

The one was what paſſed at *Paris* between the *French King* himſelf, and the *Marquiſs De la Fuente* Extrordinary Embaſſador from *Spain*; And the other, what the *French Embaſſador* (the *Arch Biſhop* of *Ambrun*) declared at *Madrid* in his Maſters name.

As to the Firſt, The ſaid Marquiſs *De la Fuente* being upon his Return into *Spain*, after the Death of the late King his Maſter, and being not without apprehenſion and jealouſie, the great preparations, made in *France* were intended againſt the Queen his Miſtreſs, and the King her Son, was very earneſt with His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, to give ſome new and greater Aſſurances to the Queen of *Spayn*, of the reality and ſincerity of his intentions to quiet and ſettle her mind, againſt all the contrary advices, ſhe received from all parts; whereupon the moſt Chriſtian King did, with all poſſible Aſſeveration, engage his Faith and his Royal Word, to the ſaid Queen, that he would Religiouſly keep the Peace, and continue a faithful friendſhip both to her and to her Son.

And the *Arch Biſhop* of *Ambrun*, after the *French* Army was already in the Field, and had poſſeſſed *Charleroy*, ſome four or five days before the News of it came to *Madrid*; did in *Verbo Sacerdotis*. And upon all that is moſt ſacred amongſt the *Roman Catholicks*, proteſt and vow to the Queen, that his Maſter intended nothing leſs, than what was reported of him: And would never break with the King of *Spayn*, or invade his Dominions as long as he was under Age.

But the March of the *French* Army, and the Hoſtilities they committed, agreeing ſo little with their promiſes, and the ſame being complained of; They anſwered, it was no Breach, and that they only went to take poſſeſſion of what belonged to them.

This Warr, or as the *French* term it; this friendly poſſeſſing themſelves of the *Spaniſh* Dominions, ended by the Treaty of *Aix*. After which, contrary to the Treaty it ſelf; they firſt diſmantled all the

the ſtrong Places and Holds of the County of *Burgundy*! carried away all the Munitions out of the Country, and would have deſtroyed the rich Salt Pits of that Province, had not the powerful interpoſition both of *England*, *Holland*, prevented that ſpoyl.

Notwithſtanding the ſame Treaty of *Aix*, they exacted great Contributions from the Dutchyes of *Lymbourg*, and *Luxembourg*; They lay a new claim to ſome Towns, as important as any of thoſe that have been granted to them by the Peace: They have confiſcated the Eſtates of the Subjects of the King of *Spayn*, that would not forſwear their Allegiance; and have not ſpared the very Royal Houſe of *Mary Mont*: Nay, as if theſe infractions were not ſufficient and ſtill to encroach as far as they were able, they forced their way with great quantities of Merchandiſe through the *Spaniſh* Territories without paying the Cuſtomes, and not long after endeavoured to ſurpriſe the Town of *Mons* in *Hainault*.

Thus they have dealt with *Spayn* ever ſince the *Pirenean Treaty*.

Let us ſee now, how other Princes have fared with them; we'l begin with the Duke of *Lorrain*.

By the *Pirenean Treaty*, the ſaid Duke was to be reſtored to his Dutchy of *Lorrain*, with all the Places and Towns which he had poſſeſſed in the Biſhopricks of *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun*. But *France* after the execution of the other Articles of the ſaid Treaty, deferred as long as they could the performance of that part, which related to the Duke, and refuſed ſtill to return him his Country; till they had brought him to make another Treaty with them, whereby he was forced to part with ſeveral conſiderable places over and above what had been granted to them by the general Peace; Then after a year and an half of an unſettled poſſeſſion, during which under ſeveral unjuſt pretences, new quarrels were picked every day: They forced him with a conſiderable Army, to give them his Town of *Marſall*.

And not long after, they again compelled him to ſign a new *Treaty*; more diſadvantagious yet then the two former; ſince which he could, as little as before have a quiet enjoyment of that little they had left him. They every day encroached upon his juriſdiction, the Limits of his Territories, and his Soveraignty it ſelf; They laid enormious

enormious Taxes upon his Subjects, They caused him to disband his Forces, and to raise new men again as they thought fit, They kept him from revenging his own quarrells, to take part in that of others, They let loose all his Enemies against him, and stopped the Progress of his Armies, as soon as he had the least advantage, And in few words he was all that while more a Vassell to *France*, then a soveraign. But yet all this would not satisfie the *French Court*, And taking it ill that his Obedience was not altogether so blind as they would have it, they ordered one of their Generals to seize his Person, and to bring him either dead or alive, As it was very near being effected, A new way of dealing with a Soveraign Prince, not known, yet in these parts of the World, and which may give some hopes to Europe of seeing ere long the West Governed by *Bashaws* as well as the East.

The Kingdom of *Poland* comes next, which hath layn a bleeding ever since they have had a *French Queen*, & which is at this instant in an eminent danger of being conquered by the *Turks*, through the means of the *French Cabalbe*, who have called into the Kingdom the Enemie of the Christian name meerly because they could not have a King either of *French* blood, or of *French* interest.

The Duke of *Newburg* was not much better used, And whilst they caused him to engage the greatest part of his Estate almost beyond redemption in hopes of the *Polish Crown*, which they had promised to raise him to by the help of a strong party, they had made in that Kingdome. They underhand contrary both to their Treaties (as well with the *Elector of Brandenburg* as with himself) and to their reiterated promises and vows both by word of mouth and in writing, did by their Creatures and Agents Oppose the said Dukes pretentions, and endeavoured with all industry to have the Prince of *Conde* prefered before all his Competitors. A Particular deduction whereof will (if ever published) without any other Instance be a sufficient warning to all Princes, And give them a Perfect Character of the *French Court*.

The *Emperour* hath as little reason to thank them, And at the very time the most *Christian King* sent him forces to joyn with his Army against the *Turks*, they begun to settle a Correspondence with the *Count Serin*, *Franchipany*, *Nadasti*, and *Totzenback*, from whence their so well known, Conspiracy hath since broken out, As hath appeared by the depositions and confessions of some of the Accomplices who had been instrumental in carrying both Money and Letters, from the *French* Minister at *Vienna* to the said Conspirators. Not

Not to speak now of what arts they used to hinder his Election at first, (And since that to lessen his Authority and disturb all *Germany* by their Intrigues and privite Treaties with several Privaes contrary to the Treaty at *Munster*.

To which may be added, that one of the great Motives of bringing the *Turks* into *Poland* was the marriage of the *Emperors* Sister with their King.

Yet it must be owned also that the *French* seem to have repented their pernitious intrigues & Caballing in that Kingdome, for when they saw the *Emperor* preparing in Earnest to assist the *Dutch*, to dissuade him from that designe, & to engage him (if it had been possible) not to concern himself or take part in the Quarrel, they very fairly offered him to put into his hands and deliver him all the Original Letters they had from their Creatures and freinds in *Poland*, To the end both his *Emperial Majesty* and the *King* of *Poland*, his Brother might take what course they thought fit with those Rebells: A fair warning to all those that preferr *French* money before their Loyalty, and the true interest of their Country.

Nay I doubt the *Swedes*, their good Freinds have not always been pleased with them. And they cannot to this day forget that some ten Years since, having made a Treaty with the *French* whereby they were to receive, by way of Gratuity or Pension, Sixteene hundred Thousand Crowns, the *French* (upon second thoughts) finding their Treaty with *Sweden* of little use to them refused to ratifie it, & sent them *Monsiaur de Tralon*, who, without more words told them in short, That the King his Master declared it to be void, A fine Curt stile for one Prince to use to another! And a short Majestick way of Rescinding all Treaties.

It were both needless and tedious, to examine now how well they have observed their Treaties with *Holland*, since they cannot so much as assigne the least cause of the Warr they make now, and in their declaration tell us onely of a Mauvaise satisfaction of their being ill pleased, which would tend to the Diminution of the glory of a most *Christian King*, unless to please himself better, he put Europe in a Flame and endeavour to bring all under his subjection.

But it may be thought all other Princes and States have had much cause to complain of the *French* not to say worse, his Majesty hath been hitherto either more fortunate or more beholding to their generosity and Kindness. This must be now inquired into, I will not in-

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fiſt much upon the expreſſions of their kindneſs to his Majeſties Perſon, whilſt he was abroad, ſince they may pretext the Intereſt of their Kingdom, and palliate their dureſs and inhumane dealing, by a neceſſity of preſerving themſelves, But I hope no ſuch neceſſity compell'd them to oppoſe his Majeſties happy reſtoration with ſo much violence as they did, and to Caball with his greateſt Enemies to keep him out of his Kingdoms, which his Majeſty was ſo ſenſible of, that upon his coming into *England* he commanded away the *French Embaſſador Bordeanx*, and would not ſuffer him to come into his preſence.

Since that time they have often endeavoured to ingratiate themſelves, and have made great proteſtations. But after ſeveral propoſitions of Leagues, and many arts uſed to raiſe Jealouſies between us and the *Hollanders* (Dreading not nig more then a durable and firm friendſhip between two Nations, who if united might eaſily ſet what bounds they pleated to their ambition) they at laſt ſided with the *Dutch*, though with no other intention then to ſee us deſtroy each other, or at leaſt ſo farr weaken and exhauſt our ſelves, that they might with leſs oppoſition invade their Neighbours, and encreaſe their Naval ſtrength, nay their policy went further, and in the very heat of the Warr they ſtill kept Negotiations on foot, and made overtures and propoſals of peace by meanes of the late *Queene Mother*, whom in the end they deceived ſo farr, as to aſſure her (and by her his Majeſty) that the *Dutch* would ſet no Fleet out (that Summer, the peace was concluded) whilſt underhand they preſſed the ſaid *Dutch* with all the Vigour and earneſtnes imagineable to fit out their Ships, with a promiſe of joyning theires to them.

Upon this Paroll of the *French* Court 'tis too well known we had no Fleet out, as well as what followed upon it, when the *Dutch* meeting with no oppoſition, entered into the Rivar of *Chatham*; ſo that though the *French* had no other hand in't, they had been ſtill the true cauſe of that unhappy accident: But withal, it is more then probable they were themſelves the Authors of that Counſel, and moſt certain it is they knew of the deſign before the attempt was made: As might be proved by ſeveral inſtances if neceſſary:

After this, the Peace being concluded at *Breda*; the *French* were by the Treaty, to return us St. *Chriſtophers*, in the manner and form therein expreſſed. But inſtead of performing it according to the true meaning (and the very Letter of the Article) they have ſtill from time to time, upon ſeveral unjuſt and frivolous pretences, put off his Majeſties

jesties Commissioners that went to receive it; till seeing a necessity of complying with us in so small a matter, whilst we were preparing to run so great a danger for their sake; they delivered it at last to Sir *Charles Wheeler*, somewhat above a year since. But before the delivery of it, they had destroyed all the Plantations, plundered and carried away all that was portable; laid the whole Country wast, And left it in a much worse condition, than if it had never been Planted. And as if the detaining of his Majesties Territories had not been sufficient, they interrupted the Trade of his Subjects in those parts; and assuming to themselves the Soveraignty of those Seas; they would not suffer any Ships but their own, to Sayl by, or about their *Islands*. And in Truth upon no other Ground, have brought in as Prizes, and confiscated several Vessels. Not to speak now of the great discouragement our *French* Trade hath many years since lain under; through their unjust practices and manifold devices, which have been such, that we do not of late send into *France* the fourth or fifth part of what Goods and Commodities were formerly sent over.

This late carriage of theirs in *America*, brings us to their present Alliance with his Majestie. And as the greatest care of those that have advised the King to this League, have been to keep from the view and from the knowledge of the World, what *Articles* are agreed upon. It is not to be expected we should instance in the particular Breaches of what we are all strangers to; for Example, we cannot tell whether it was agreed the *French Squadron* should fight, and so dare not assure they have broken their Treaty by not fighting. But I suppose there are very few, but have heard of the Wager laid by the *Spanish Embassador* in the beginning of the War, And how far the *French Conduct* agreed with his Predictions. I would not neither impeach any man upon general Reports and Rumors, but however it is observable, That the greatest number of the *Dutch* Commanders are of Opinion, and have often publickly declared, That the *French* Ships were thus kindly used by theirs out of a particular respect *De Wits* Brother had to them.

If from the Sea we come a shore, we'l find (as far at least as they came to our knowledge) most of their promises deceitful; all the Art imaginable used to ensnare his Majestie.

And lastly, a perfect and reiterated Breach, of the essence of their Treatie, whatever the words may be; All those that have been never

so little conversant at Court, may remember that one of the great Arguments used and suggested by the *French*, to make the conquest of *Holland* appear both safe and easie; was that his most *Christian Majesty* had assurances from all the great Princes in *Europe*; they would no ways concern themselves in the Quarrel: *Spayn* would be glad to see their old Rebells Chastised, The Emperor had his hands full, and durst not stir if he would for fear of the *Turks*. *Brandenburg* should demand his Towns, and the *Northern* Crowns, would either sit still or endeavor to have a share in the spoyl. And this was soreadily embraced, that even after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty betwixt *Spayn* and the *United Provinces*; they would not own there was so much as any agreement. And for a good while we flattered our selves, That the Leagues with the *Catholick King* and other Princes, were surmises of the *Dutch*, to raise their Reputation, and quiet the minds of their People. But when this wast past denying, they came off with slighting discourses of the Forces of the *Dutch Allies*; and *Monsieur de Turenne* would cut them all to pieces, if ever their Temerity did bring within his reach.

At the Rate the Alliance with *France*, was discoursed off before the War broke out, standers by could not but think (and I believe if Truth were enquired into, it will be found his Majesty intended no more at first, and was engaged no farther,) the *French* should be the Principal in this War, and England joyn their Forces with them as *Auxiliaries*, to have still in case of need, a safe and houourable Retreat in their Power. But as soon as the *French* thought his Majestie could not well go back nor take new Counsels; they openly declared it was none of their Quarrel, and that they only engaged in it to assist his Majesty, out of respect to his person. By which means his Majesty was perswaded and induced to declare War first, and to expect afterwards the assistance of the *French*.

I suppose his Majesty will not thank them neither for giving out in all *Roman Catholick* Princes Courts, That this is a War of Religion, undertaken meerly for the propagation of the *Catholick Faith*, and as the *French* Minister at *Vienna*, expressed it in a solemn Speech to the Emperors Counsel, which hath been since Printed in *French*, that the *Hollanders* being *Heretick*s, who had forsaken their God; all good Christians are bound to joyn and unite to extirpate them and to implore Gods blessing upon so good a work. Nay to confirm this

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the more they have lately declared and assured many Princes that to let *Europe* see how far they are from any such design as have been laid to their Charge; and to satisfie all the World, they entred into this War out of a Religious Zeal; and for the Glory of God, they are ready to part with all their Conquests, and return to the *Hollanders* all the Towns they have taken from them; if they will but re-establish the true Worship they have banished from their Territories.

How far now this may be agreeable to his Majesties Interest, or to the *XXXIX Articles*; let any unprejudiced man judge.

But an undeniable proof of the uprightness of the *French Court*, is their carriage in the Negotiations of Peace with the *States*: In short, the matter of Fact is thus:

The passage of the *French Army* over that Branch of the *Rhyne*, called the *Waell*; having caused a general consternation all over the Country, and the confusion they were in, being such, that they could hardly resolve whether to yield or defend themselves.

The *States* on the 11*th.* of *June*, named several *Deputies* to be sent, some to his Majesty, and the rest to the *French King*; to know of them both upon what terms they would be willing to agree and come to a Peace.

Those that came to his Majesty, were met upon the way as far as *Graves End*, to forbid them the Court, and were conveyed to *Hampton Court*; there to continue in an honourable confinement, till we could hear from the most *Christian King*, and know of him whether the said *Deputies* might be admitted; his Majesty being unwilling to give the least offence to the *French*; And not thinking it either lawful or convenient (without their participation) so much as to hear what the *Dutch Deputies* Errand was.

But the other *Deputies* came no sooner to the *French Court*, but two *Secretaries of State* were sent to them, and without further delay, desired to know first if they had full Power to Treat; and in the next place, what the *States* could propose in order to a speedy Peace. The *Deputies* answered, they were only sent to know his Most *Christian Majesties* Pleasure, and that their Masters had thought it a greater respect to him to receive his Propositions then to offer any Conditions themselves, with this answer; the *French Ministers* went to their Masters, and came back immediately to the *Deputies*, to let them know, it was expected the *States* should make the Propositions, and that the most

Christian King could not enter upon any Treaty unless they had full Power. Telling them withal (to quicken them and to hasten the conclusion of the work) that they were to consider, That whatever his most *Christian Majesty* had Conquered, was already his own; and therefore he could no ways part with it, unless they gave him an Equivalent, as well for what he might Conquer farther, before the Conclusion of the Treaty, as for what he possessed at that time: Whereupon *Monsieur de Groot* (one of the *Deputies*) being gone to the *Hague*, he was sent back with all speed, and authorised in a very ample manner, together with his Collegues to treat and conclude a Peace with the *French*.

Upon the return of the said *De Groot*, with the Powers after some conferences (part of them with *De Groot* alone) *Monsieur de Louvoy*, one of the *Secretaries of State*) gave the *Dutch Deputies* a project of a Treaty, or rather the pretentions of the King his Master: Upon the granting of which, he was both willing and ready to return to his former Amity with the *States*, and conclude a firm Peace with them.

Whereupon two things are to be observed; The one that the Conditions were such, that (if granted) would have made the *French King* as perfectly Master of the Country, as if he had conquered all by the Sword: and the other, that in all the *Articles* (which are still in being and may be produced if need be) there was not the least word relating to *England*; and no more notice taken of his Majesty, or greater care of his interest, then if he had not been concerned in the War, or in no League with the *French*. So that if by a wonderful providence of God, the said Treaty, had not been unexpectedly broken off. *Europe* had in one day lost it's Liberty; And all we could have expected afterwards, had been the favour *Polyphemus* shewed to his Guests.

And to demonstrate further, that the intention of the *French Court*, was not his Majesty should be a gainer by the War, *Monsieur de Groot* (whose word if he be not very much wronged ought to go a great way when he speakes of the *French*) declared at his second coming to the *Hague*, with the before mentioned Articles that the *French Ministers* had answered him, the States his Masters might deal as they pleased with *England*, and come off as cheap as they would, because (as they pretended) they were not bound or engaged by their Treaty to procure them

them any advantages. A happy thing in the meane while to be engaged in such a Warr, with so Generous an *Allie*.

While this negotiation was on foot, and before the Treaty could be Concluded; the Prince of *Orange* was miraculously restored to the dignity and authority of his Ancestors, which having altogether Eclipsed the party that was inclined to treat with *France* upon almost any Terms, and the rest of the Country being all under Water, the *French* lost at once both their hopes of carrying the whole matter by a Treaty, and the opsrtunity of making a further Progress by their Armes.

At the same time My Lord Duke of *Buckingham* and my Lord *Arlington* went into *Holland*. And the *French* who knew already they could neither bring the *Dutch* to a compliance, nor Swim over to the remaining Townes, And withall being full of Apprehension and fear that by the Authority of the *Prince* of *Orange*, and through the interest he was like to have in his Majestty (chiefly if their practices and honest dealings came to be discovered) a Seperate peace might be made between *England* and the *United Provinces*, they Acted their part so succesfully with our Plenipotentiaries, that they perswaded them to enter (in his Majesties name) into a new engagement, not to treat or conclude with the *Dutch* any Peace or Truce without them: For as to their promising the like, it was a perfect mockery on their part, since they had already done their utmost to Treat without *England*, and that after they had miscarried in the attempt, nothing could secure them but his Majesties refusing to accept of what conditions the *Dutch* would be willing to giant Him.

After this new Contract made, our Plenipotentiaries together with the *French Ministers* sent their joynt demands, and propositions to the *Dutch*, to be granted in Tenn daies or else no Peace to be made, which was the next Master-peece of the *French*, for it is to be observed, first that the *French* Demandt were in substance the same as they had made at first in their negotiation with Monsieur *de Groote*, And since they were so unjust, and so Enormious, that the best friends they had then amongst the States could hardly swallow them themselves, (much less to bring the generality to give their consent) without some Modification It was not to be expected that the Government being since the late Change, much more avers to the *French* then before, the same propositions again, should be better entertained, which was rendred the more improbable by the addition of the *English* demands.

Secondly,

Secondly, The *French*, by the exceſſive height of their demands, ſeemed to have encouraged (if not perſwaded by ſome more effectual means) the ſaid Plenepotentiaries not to come much ſhort of them, which was attended with Two Fatal conſequences, the one, that the Warr was certainly, by it, entayled upon his Majeſty, And the other that it was a meanes to alienate the mindes and affections of the *Dutch*, who were then inclined to give thoſe advantages to *England*, which cannot rationally be expected hereafter.

Thirdly, Though the reſpective claimes of the Two Kings had been ſingly tolerable; yet the ioyning of them together made it impoſſible for the *Dutch* to grant either. From whence the *French* (and very rationally) conceived hopes that the *Dutch* finding themſelves over ballanced by the joynt power of their Enemies, and ſeeing no way to come out of ſo deſtructive a Warr, and to have peace (and not a firm nor a durable one neither) without dividing their Country into a hundred pieces, and cutting of all their Sinews, Had rather caſt themſelves into the Arms of their Conquerour and laying aſide all thoughts of Soveraignty; live in an entire Body under the *French* Domination. At leaſt it were ſome comfort, if the *French Court* had but kept to this laſt agreement, which in ſo many reſpects was advantagious to them, But, that they have not done neither: And as ſoon as they ſaw moſt Princes in *Europe*, begin to be in Earneſt, and that great ſuccours were preparing for the Aſſiſtance of the *Dutch*, beſides what forces were already in the Field, They underhand made new overtures of Peace, and have ſtill to this day been ſending privat Meſſages to the *Dutch*, wherein they take no greater care of *England* than they had done at *Utricht*, And if the *Dutch* had not perſiſted in their refuſal to Treat without their Allies, the *French* had long ſince concluded without theirs, and that upon very moderate Terms, as to the *Dutch*.

I ſuppoſe this will ſeeme very ſtrange, and will hardly be credited, but ſince as long as I am under this diſguiſe, I cannot juſtifie it as fully as otherwiſe I might do it, All I can ſay at preſent is, there are thoſe in the Kingdom that know the truth of it as well as my ſelf, and I hope the world will not be long without a full diſcovery of it, And thus I end the firſt part of this diſcourſe which hath ſwelled unawares into a greater bulk then I intended at firſt, though the matter would bear a great deal more without being exhauſted.

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II.

Let us now come to the *Second Head*, and examine what the iſſue of this Warr may prove and what may rationally be expected, it will come to.

Were it either poſſible in nature, or ſo much as to be imagined that *Holland* might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and depopulated, and their Inhabitants either deſtroyed or Tranſported into remote *Colonies*, or part of them brought into this Kingdome, to encreaſe the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Juſtice or Chriſtian Charity could be forceable enough to put a ſtop to ſuch a deſigne: And in this caſe it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Intereſt of *England* ſtated (as unanſwerable as his Arguments are) to perſwade men either Biaſſed, or not very well acquainted with the ſtate of Forreigne Affairs, That it muſt be the chief Intereſt of *England* to ſupport the preſent Government of *Holland*.

But ſuch a deſtruction being not to be thought on, or expected by any man that is in his Witts, and ſince the Scituation of the Country, and its Commodiouſneſs for trading in many reſpects, together with the Natural and Laborious Induſtery of the Inhabitants, will ſtill continue under any change. To ſatisfy our ſelves how far we may be gainers by this Warr, we muſt conſider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of poſſibility.

In order to that I conceive all men will grant one of theſe four things muſt be ſuppoſed.

Firſt. The abſolute conqueſt of the *United Provinces* by the *French*. Or?

Secondly. Our Conquering of them.

Thirdly. A Diviſion and Sharing of the Country between us and the *French*.

Fourthly. and Laſtly, The *Dutch* recovering their loſſes, and with the help of their Allies, their withſtanding both *England* and *France*, of each of them in Order.

The abſolute Conqueſt of the *United Provinces* by the *French*, and their being brought under their ſubjection is a thing of that dreadful conſequence that the very thoughts of it, muſt needs raiſe the blood of all true

true *Engliſh men* And there is hardly any remedy too violent for ſo deſperate a cure or means that could be called unjuſt, if neceſſary to prevent ſo great an evil, And therefore inſtead of looſing time to prove what is ſo manifeſt and ſo obvious to the meaneſt capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen to lay the preſent ſtate of things to heart, and humbly move both Houſes to conſider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is conſiſtent with that Intereſt, with which they are intruſted, to haſten it by unſeaſonable and pernicious compliance:

Secondly, As to our Maſtering the *Low Countries*, it can be but one of theſe two ways:

Firſt, Our ſubduing of them by a Landing; and withal, beating the *French* out of what they poſſeſs already: Or,

Secondly, Their voluntary yielding to us, and ſubmiting themſelves to his Majeſty.

The firſt can hardly be ſo much as ſuppoſed or imagined by any Rational Man: For 1. If in the middeſt of their late diſtractions and the unſpeakable confuſion, which was in every part of the Country, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attempted: How can it be expected it ſhould be practicable by the next Summer, now they are all United and ſtrengthned by the aſſiſtance of their *Allies*. 2. How can it be thought poſſible to Land an Army conſiderable enough to take all their Towns, and Conquer the whole Country; Nay, to Conquer the Conquerers themſelves, and beat the *French* out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occaſion a great diſorder and conſternation in the Countrey; and that the *Dutch* ſhould not prove able to oppoſe our Landing; and at the ſame time to keep the *French* out, and defend themſelves to the Landwards, what would the conſequence of this be, but only to enable the *French* to Maſter the whole Country, whilſt the *Dutch* ſhould divide and draw off their Forces to oppoſe us? It being much eaſier for the *French* who are already in the Country, to March with all their Forces to *Amſterdam*, and to the reſt of their Towns, before we can Land; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4. Laſtly, if the *French Ships* are to have a ſhare in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Maſters; and that they ſhall not rather turn tayl againſt us, if occaſion be?

And

And as to the voluntary yielding of the *Dutch*, and their giving themselves up to us; I may say it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other: And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But because some of our great men, have (even in Print) made use of this as of an Argument, both to justifie the War in point of prudence, and to perswade the Nation to joyn and concur with the *Caballe* in their dark Counsels: It will be necessary, and we owe that respect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care.

Were the *United Provinces* still entire, and untouched and they in an election to joyn with and submitt themselves (upon terms) either to *France* or *England*, it would be no hard matter to demonstrate and make it to appear that the ballance of true policy and reason should weigh down by much on the *French* side, And that the best part of their Trade would soon, if incorporated with us runn out of their Chanells into ours; which all understanding men amongst them are so sensible of, that in case this were in agitation, the interest of Religion (which besides they could secure some other way) should hardly carry it against profit and self preservation. But not to multiply debates, and granting now that in such a case, the *Dutch* would preferr our Domination before that of the *French*: Let us not examine what might have been if our suppositions were true: but what is like to be *Defacto* & may rationally be expected as the cause stands.

First it must be observed that though their *Maritime Provinces* be farr the most considerable, and those which have made that Commonwealth so powerful and so famous all over the World, yet their In-Land *Provinces*, are of no less importance to the preservation of the whole, and are the Bull-works and out-works of the other, without which the main Body would be soon streightned and brought in a little time to the greatest extremities.

For this reason the *Spaniards* never offered Peace to the *Dutch*, nor could they have accepted of it if offered, till being Masters of Seaven *Provinces*, and having withal conquered several Towns in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, to be a fence to their out *Provinces*, their *Territories* proved of a Competent extent to Lodg and Maintain upon their *Frontiers* the greatest Armies. And by removing the Seat of the Warr from their Trading *Provinces*, be so much the more able to continue it, rather with advantage to them then with the least inconvenience or trouble.

2. The Second thing we must take notice of is that the greatest advantage of the Scituation of the *United Provinces*, lyeth in that several of the greatest Rivers in *Europe*, not only run through their Country, but disimbogue into the Ocean within their Precincts. This openeth them an easy and an advantagious trade into most parts of *Germany*, the *Spanish Low Countries*, and some *Provinces* of *France*, and makes a Reciprocation of commerce, and as it were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the first to carry at a cheap rate to the furthest parts of the World what goods & commodities the above mentioned Countries afford, and to return them by meanes of the same, the Richest spoyles of the East and West.

These natural Advantages accrewing to the Inhabitants of these respective *Provinces*, by their being all *United* under the same Government, do link and tie them so fast together that nothing but an external and irresistable force can divide them, And who ever comes to be Master of the Rivers must needs in a short time, either be beaten out of his Conquests or else bring all the Havens and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the same subjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers, and the Rivers without the Ports, being altogether useless, and a Foundation for an Endless and Destructive Warr.

This being premised, the conclusion will easily be drawn, and since the *French* do already possess half of their Countrey, and are Masters of their chief Rivers, if the *Dutch* come either to loose the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Soveraign State, or else are brought to the necessity of choosing a Master, It is plain they'l rather submit themselves to the *French King* who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country without which they cannot subsist, than by giving up the remaining part to *England* to entail a Warr upon them, which besides their subjection to Forreigner as wel as if they were under the *French*, will exhaust what Treasury they may have left, and from a flourishing Estate bring them to perfect beggery.

To sum up all, it cannot be supposed the *Dutch* will ever choose a Master, and submitt themselves to the Government of a Forreign *Prince*, unless they are Driven to it by an unavoydable necessity: This necessity cannot proceed but from the sense they may have of their own weaknes, and of a desire to live in Peace and free themselves of a Warr which is so destructive to them, Now, if they do submit themselves

ſelves to *England*, in oppoſition to the *French*, the Peace they ſeek will be further of then ever, & their remaining Country will be the ſeat of an endleſs Warr, whereas, if they do give themſelves up to the *French*, they will be United again in an entire body, enjoy reſt and peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in *Europe* is beſt able to defend them againſt all their Enemies and whoſe intereſt will be to give all poſſible encouragement to their Trade and to make their Countrey the Nurſery of his Seamen, and in all other reſpects the ſupport of his Naval Strength. Not to mention that if they muſt be ſlaves, firſt, they might rationally hope to have the ſatisfaction afterwards, of lending a helping hand to bring their Neighbours, and in truth all *Europe* into the ſame condition with them.

Thirdly we come now to the dividing and ſharing of the Country with the *French*, which by what hath already been ſaid will appear either impracticable or rather hurtful than advantageous, for this ſharing muſt be either by a Conqueſt on both ſides, as the *Dutchies* of *Clevees* and *Juliers* were formerly, when *Prince Maurice and the Marquiſs of Spinola* entred at the ſame time into thoſe Countries with tow great Armies, and took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and the other of the Duke of *Newburg*, or elſe that the *French* having Conquered and poſſeſſed all, ſhould give us part of their acquiſition.

The firſt cannot be ſuppoſed as long as we have no Army in the Country, And in truth can bring none able to match that of the *French*, and to Conquer as faſt as they, though they had not a foot of Ground yet in the *United Provinces*, But as the caſe doth now ſtand, it is plain they would be Maſters of all before our long Boats could come on Shore.

And as to their giving us a ſhare, after an abſolute Conqueſt, there are three things to be conſidered, 1. It is worth the inquiry, how farr they are engaged by their Treaty, and what ſhare we are to have: for all appearances are very deceitful, if the *French* have promiſed to give us any thing more then a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath been ſaid before, at what rate their promiſes and other ſuch engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and conſtitution of the Country being ſuch that it cannot ſtand divided, without not only a very great inconvenience to both parties, but the deſtruction of one of them. The *French King*, what ever he had pro-

miſed; cannot be willing to give us ſuch a ſhare as would bring his own under the *Engliſh* ſubjection. And if his Majeſty ſhould have but an inconſiderable part of the Conqueſt he could neither reap any benifit by it nor protect it againſt the *French* power without exhauſting both his Treaſure and his Men. Nay it may be ſaid further, and all that know the Country will grant that unleſs *Amſterdam* with the Zuyder Sea were ſplitt and all the ſhipping divided to have each one half of the whole, no true diviſion can be made, And whoever is Maſter of that Town will ſoon or late ſubdue all the reſt.

It is true if we had ſome Sea Towns, and the *French* had nothing to do with the reſt, it might be for a while a Curb to *Holland* and procure us ſome advantages in Trade. But if the *French* poſſeſs all the Countrey, what proportion can there be between their acquiſition and ours? And after the acceſſion of ſo great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagin ſome few places they ſhould give us, would be a ballance to their forces, or a ſecure fence againſt their Ambitious and aſpiring thoughts?

To cleare this further, and to demonſtrate how dangerous it is for *England* to deſtroy the Ballance of *Europe* in hopes of having a ſhare in the ſpoyl, and of encreaſing our Dominions, It is to be conſidered that in the peruſal of our *Engliſh* Hiſtories, we find all our Foreign Conqueſts either unfortunate in the end or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilſt to maintain them, the Seas muſt be perpetually croſſed, for ſupplying of them, with Men, Mony, and neceſſaries. Nay, after the Conquert of the beſt part of the Kingdom of *France* we could not defend it long againſt the remaining part, And even loſt what belonged to his Majeſties Royal Anceſtors by right of inheritance, after a quiet and uninterrupted poſſeſſion for ſome hundreds of years. Since that time what new acquiſitions hath been made, hath likewiſe been returned either for conſiderable Sums of Money, or upon ſome other conſiderations relating to the State of *Europe* in thoſe daies.

And leaſt it might be objected, That thoſe former Conqueſts were either leſs prudently undertaken, or harder to be kept than theſe we ſeem to go upon now: it is obſervable firſt that our Fore-fathers either undertooke a lone the ſaid Conqueſts or elſe if the joyn'd with any other Prince (as when they were aſſiſted by the Houſe of *Burgundy*) they ſtill had and kept to themſelves the greateſt and moſt conſiderable ſhare. Secondly That it was ever the intereſt of ſome of the Neighbouring

bouring Princes *England* should preserve some part (at least) of the said Acquisitions, and have still a footing on the main, for the Common safety and for the speedier and easier relief of our Allyes, And yet though these two conditions mett together either the essential difficulty of the thing it self or our natural unaptness to preserve what we have once gotten, hath made all *European* Conquests unsuccesful, and in truth prejudicial to us.

But the case being thus, what Judgmemt can we make, and what can we rationally expect or promise our selves of our intended joynt conquest with the *French*, where those conditions before mentioned are altogether wanting? And where first fart from conquering our selves we only countenance and promote (by our streightning the *Dutch* by Sea) the invasion of a Country, which even whilst it was nothing near so considerable as it is now all *Europe* hath looked upon, not only as a fair step, but as the best part of the way to the Universal Monarchy: And which did once occasion so great a confedracy against the House of *Austria* to wrest those Provinces out of their hands, 2. It is as plain, it is not the *French Kings* intrest to give his Majesty a considerable part of the Conquests, nor to let us enjoy long what he might peradventure give us at first for some other ends of his own. And to secure this unknown share to us, I do not see we have now any *Talbotts* or Earls of *Bedford* at the head of our Victorious Armies to set up his Majesties Standard in the Conquered Towns, and leave *English* Garisons in them. But instead of that whilst the *French* march on and do enlarge their Empire, we please our selves with calling the *French* Forces our Forces, And endeavour if not to perswade our selves at least to perswade others All this is done for the honour and glory of the *English* Nation, for the Advancement of Trade, for the safety of his Majesties Person, the support of his Royal authority, And the happiness of his Kingdoms, it is true we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have, but somewhat we'le have however (say our Great men.) And we will not believe the *French King* shall let us go without a reward, for the paines we take in raising him, as much as in us lyeth, to the Throne of the universal Monarchy. Nay, supposing the worst (saith a great and noble Champion for the *French*, in a Printed Letter to *Sir Thomas Osborn*) that we should be so ill advised, as to let the *French* take all and leave us nothing, yet even in that case, the *French King* would rather make their strength at Sea inconsiderable,

derable, by their being subject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Master.

I confess this is a new Demonstration in Politicks which few men would have dreamed of: and if that be all our safety, I hope no true *English* man will be swayed by the authority or quality of those who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn *England* into a *French Province*.

Fourthly. The extream danger and fatal consequences of some of the former suppositions, and the impracticableness of the other, being thus (& I hope clearly) demonstrated; we need not loose much time to press that incase (which is the only possible event that remaineth) the *Dutch* shall recouer their losses, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with *England* and *France*, It cannot be his Majesties interest to continue a Warr which will miserably impoverish his Kingdoms, and by the continual Losses the *Merchants* do and are like to sustain, bring the Trade of the Nation into such a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace, Especially if *Spain* be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, As it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do.

But because I see many are apt to look upon this Warr through a kind of Cloud, and seem to be unwilling to have a distinct Notion of the ill consequences with which it is attended, but reflect only in General and confusedly upon a supposed distruction of the *Dutch*, & some imaginary Advantages accrewing to us by it, which yet they cannot instance in; much less demoustrate upon any rational grounds: I think it necessary to add to what we have said allready, some few considerations relating both to *Spain*, and the *Empire*.

As to *Spain*, it is first well known what that *Crown* is, to expect from *France*, as soon as these may have any oportunity of destroying them. And I suppose no body doubts but that the *Spanish Court* will by all possible means oppose the Encrease and stop the Progress of the greatest and formidablest Enemies they have.

2. It is as plain, that in case the *French* come to be Master the *United Provinces*, the *Spanish Neather-Lands* will of Course and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithstanding the famous Triple League which by the way will be Triple no longer, when the *Dutch* Common Wealth is gone.

3. Although the Crown of *Spain* had no Dominions in the *Low-Countries*

Countries, It would be as much their interest to preserve the *United Provinces*, entire, And in true policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very last of their men to prevent if it be possible so formidable an accession of Naval Power to the *French*, after which no *Plate* Fleet or *Gallions* could ever come safe, nor consequently their Monarchy stand much Longer.

4. The *Emperor* being already engaged, and hostilities begun between him and the *French*, *Spain* can no longer stand out, and they are bound to run the same fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the Joynt-interest of their Family.

5. And lastly *Spain* having already by their Assistance given to the *Dutch*, whereby all the considerable Towns in *Brabant*, where preserved, & by the late Attempt upon *Charleroy* so highly incensed the *French* against them, they can venture nothing more by an open Breach, it is much safer for them to declare whilst the hands of the *French* are full, then to be exposed to their fury after their Conquest ended, From all this it plainly Followeth, that a breach between *Spain* and *France* is not to be avoyded, But the same Arguments prove likewise, that, in case we do persist in our Alliance with the *French*, they must break with us as well as with them: And since they are so farr concerned in the preservation of the *Dutch*, they canotn think themselves safe if the others are destroyed.

It is their Interest by making this Warr as destructive to us as they can, to perswade us more effectually, than they could do hitherto into a friendship with their Allies, for to say they dare not proceed to a breach; they are afraid of us, and we know how to Order them in the *West-Indies*: This were good if their *All* did not ly at stake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more then the same *All*, Whereas to the Contrary by venturing all, they may, and will in all likelyhood, save both themselves and all *Europe*.

This being Granted (as it must needs bee, if truth do in the least prevail with us;) I need not use many words to make all *England* sensible, of the sad consequences of a *Spanish* Warr; I'le hint only those that are undeniable: As *first*, the seizure of all our *Merchants* Estates, amounting in the whole to a vast Sum. 2. The loss of our Trade with them, which of all other is the most beneficial to the Kingdome; And without which our Wollen goods must lye upon our hands, and half of our Weavers, Spinners, *&c.* go a begging.

3. The

3. The Interruption of our *Levant* and *Plantations Trade*, which cannot in case of Breach be secured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the *Spanish* Men of War which both as to number and strength are sufficient to cruise in the *Streights*.) With what either encouragement or safety can our Traders venture abroad; if, besides, the *Dutch Capers*, the Seas come to be infested with *Ostenders*, *Biscaines*, *Majorcans*, and *Minorcans?* Who are none of them inferiors to the *Flushingers*, and are as well Skilled as they in the Art of *Piracy*; Nay, did not these very men without any help take above fifteen hundred Ships from us, in the late *Spanish War*, when *Spayn* was at the lowest; and fought alone against us and *France*. 4. By the loss or at least the interruption of our Trade, his Majesties Customes, which is the considerablest Branch of his Revenue, will come to little or nothing; so that to support the War, new Taxes must be raised in lieu of it: And proportionably so much greater Subsidies granted to his Majesty.

If from *Spayn* we come to the *Empire*; we find the *Emperor* himself and the Elector of *Brandenburg*, already engaged in the quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, so that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true *English-men*, to look farther then we have done yet, and to examine with more care the consequence of this War. For the Fire which both we and *France* have kindled, is like to consume all *Europe*, if we do not make hast to quench it, and by a timely Retreate give way to safe Counsels. And for a close to this second Part of our Discourse, I desire the following Considerations may be seriously Debated and weighed.

First, What horrid spilling of Christian Blood we'l be the occasion of, if by our willful promoting of the Ambitious designes of the *French* (even so Palpable against our Interest) we force all the rest of *Europe* to take up Armes in their own defence, and to unite all for their Common safety & for the preservation of that Liberty which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to destroy.

2. How Prejudicial this Warr will be to us, in case the confedrate Princes do over Ballance the Power of *France*; And by raising the raputation and the Credit of the *Dutch* (which last is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their *Land-Armies*, but likewise to set out as great and as considerable Fleets as ever. And I do not see that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; since

since first it is very certain; and all those that knew the Country will grant, That if the *Hollanders* had but some prosperous success (either by their own Armies, Or by the help of their Allies) they'l be able to take up without trouble, and in a very short time, as much Money as they may have occasion for, And in the second place it seemeth pretty rational to judg that the house of *Austria* with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will struggle a while for their lives, and may be hard enough for the *French*.

3. But how much greater will the danger be if neither *Germany* nor *Spain* are able to stop the Progress of the *French*? And in case they must all yield, and submit themselves to the Victorious Armes of the most Christian King, what will become of Poor *England*? must his Majesty, (I speak it with due respect to his Royal and sacred person) be Tennant at will? or else Do we presume so far on our own strength as to imagin we may do what the rest of *Europe* cannot? And that though the *French* had conquered all, we should not fear them the more? and could still defend our selves against them? Let those that have Advised his Majesty to this Warr speak, they must now pull their Vizard off, they must appear in their truv shapes; & Tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the *French King* the Universal *Monarchy*, And whether to bring down new Golden showers into their Laps, *England* must at Least be made Tributary to the *French*, some few Hackney writers will not serve the Turn now, And twenty silly stories against *Holland*, cannot make it advisable for us, to joyn with the *French King* against the Greatest part of *Europe*. When this Warr was entred upon, no enemies were thought on, at least spoken of, besides the *Dutch*. This was the only game we followed at first, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the *French*. But now, supposing that we had taken never so much care for an equal sharing of the *United Provinces*, concerning which we referr our selves to what hath been said before, will our great men assure us further, That the Lines are also fallen to us in the pleasant places of *Europe*, And that his Majesty is to share the *Universal Empire* with the most *Christian King*. I grant the *Dutch* have offended us, And that our Warr against them is not unjust. But is it just therefore to destroy so many Princes who cannot Subsist without them, & who for their own preservation are forced to Venture all to preserve the *United Provinces*? In few words the Scene is altered: And though our infinite charity leads us, not to suspect the sin-

cerity of the *French* or fear the encreaſe of their power, moſt Princes of *Europe* are of another mind; And whatever coms of it; they are reſolved to ſtand by and protect the *Dutch*, as long as they are able to protect themſelves; ſo that to conquer *Holland* All their Allies muſt be deſtroyed firſt: And the *French King* muſt needs be Maſter of the beſt part of *Europe* before we can have to our ſhare either the *Briel* or *Fluſhing*.

I might Add ſeveral other conſiderations (And perhaps of no leſs weight then the former) to evidence the fatal conſequences of this Warr. But by reaſon they do relate to the ſafety and preſervation of our Lawes (as well Eccleſiaſtical as Civil) I forbear, leaſt it ſhould be thought I go about (or intend in the Iraſt) to raiſe a Jealouſie between his Majeſty and his people: leaving it wholly to the care and wiſedom of the both Houſes to provide againſt it, by thoſe means, and wayes as to them ſhall ſeem meet and neceſſary, and as the Importance of the thing it ſelf requireth.

III.

So farr (I hope we have made good what we have ſaid in the beginning of this Diſcourſe; That this was an age of wonders, And that of thoſe wonders the greateſt was the preſent Alliance with *France*, And our proſecuting the Warr in ſo dangerous an Aſſociation. But ſince there are no effects ſo rare or ſo wonderful, as well in the Civil Government as in the Courſe of Nature, but have proper Agents to produce them, it is very fit to enquire into the cauſes of our Miſterious Councills, the better to judge of their true nature.

In order to that, It will not be amiſs, to look a little abroad and conſider whether the Policy of ſome other Princes, who are engaged in the ſame Alliance with the *French* may not be a Leading caſe for us And help our diſcovery at home.

Thoſe Princes are the *Biſhop* of *Munſter* and the *Elector* of *Collen*. And as to the firſt, All the world knows and we have had a ſufficient experience our ſelves how farr Money will go with him. Nay he is ſo farr honeſt in this, that he doth think it no ſhame to own and profeſs it openly, He is but a Tennant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true intereſt The Univerſal Monarchy doth not intrench upon the Soverainity of either, his Brothers or Nephews,

And

And a considerable and rich Legacy is the only Principality he can leave them; Whilst his present Subjects are destroyed, he hoards up Treasuries for his Family, And let the worst come. Some rich Abbeyes in *France* will bring him more Revenues then his *Bishop prick*, As lately a Northern King did for the like, exchange his Crown, so that the case is cleare with him, And if the *States* would out bid the *French*, his Highness would soon forget his Old Quarrells, and prove the best of their friends.

The next is the *Elector* of *Collen*, who (to do him right) is a Religious and a worthy Prince, And one who in his owne nature, is a great lover of peace: But how could he be perswaded then to make his Country the Seat of the Warr? To give his strong holds to a Forreigner? And to expose his Subjects to all the Calamities, which the inquartering of an Insolent Army doth bring along with it. To this the answer is plain, The Softness of his nature, and the Easiness of his disposition, hath made him devolve upon his Chief *Ministers* the whole Government of his Dominions, and the absolute direction of his Counsells, His great favorite (another *Bishop*) is of the same Religion and Principles which that of *Munster* and the *Debonarity* of the Master, is no fence against the corruption of the Servant, *Quid vultis mihi dare & tradam eum vobis*, Nay if the *Bishop* of *Stratsburg* (the said Favorite) doth stick at any hard thing, and is at any time somwhat troubled in his mind; for the undoing of so many thousands of Families, and for betraying his Trust so shamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow (the late *Bishop* of *Ments* a sworn Champion for the *French*, and of whom they used to say in jeast (that he was a dear friend to them) ready to comfort them upon all occasions, and to spurr him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Interest of the *Arch Bishop* of *Collen* lyeth in this Alliance with *France*, And how comes it he will suffer his Country to be laid as waste, as if the *Turks* had over run it? Let it not be wondred at, The *French* Pensioners will have it so, And the two Brothers *Furstenburgs* are paid for it.

The Case being thus a broad, I wish our Island might boast of the same happiness as to corrupt Councellors, Which *Ireland* injoyeth in their being free from all Venimous Creatures, And that no politick Vipers might be able to breath in our *English* Ayre; without soon breathing out their lives, But alas! our Chronicles do furnish us with two many Instances of the contrary, And without looking any fur-

ther back for Prefedents his Majefty himſelf and this Very *Parliament* have (not many years ſince) ſufficiently expreſſed how farr they are of opinion that Great *Miniſters* may betray their truſt.

On the other ſide, becauſe ſome have been guilty, they muſt not be all indifferently condemned, And we ought to have a great care not to paſs a raſh Verdict upon Perſons whom his Majeſty hath irradiated with ſo many illuſtirous beams of his Princely favour. The ſafeſt way then not to wrong neither the Caball nor the truth, is to take a ſhort ſurvey of the Carriage of the chief Promoters of this Warr, Leaving the Judgment of either their Innocency or their Guilt to the unprejudiced reader.

1. I will not inſiſt much upon ſome whiſpers (come to loud talking of late) of the wonderful effects the *French Kings* Liberality had (almoſt four years ſince in converting the ſtrongeſt appoſers of his Intereſt, & though there be many od paſſages in it which are come to the Knowledg of ſeveral conſiderable membersof both houſes)yet being not able my ſelf to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the ſecond hand, I leave the full diſcovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am enformed upon the leaſt encouragement) and provided he may do it with ſafety to his Perſon will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view & to the ſatisfaction of the whole world) the firſt ſtepps towards our undoing, and to ſhew plainly when the foundation of this Miſtery of iniquity was laid.

2. But howſoever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I ſuppoſe it is not uſual to ſee ſo great a familiarity (as hath been obſerved long ſince between Forreign *Embaſſadors* and Firſt *Miniſters* of *State*, Continual treatings and frequent goings to Country houſes, there to ſtay ſeveral daies, and weeks, is a new thing in the World. And an *Embaſſadors* uſing ſo Noble a houſe with ſo much freedom, gave a juſt cauſe to all obſerving men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am ſure his Majeſty himſelf was not very well pleaſed with it at firſt, Though they have proved pretty ſucceſsful, in the Art they have uſed ſincee to reconcile him to their intrigues.

3. We have ſeen in the firſt part of this diſcourſe, how farr not only his Majeſty, but his Great men likewiſe thought it neceſſary to keep a true ballance between the reſpective Princes and States of *Europe*, and to ſtop the progreſs of the *French*. What Steps where firſt made in order to it and how the *Dutch* were Courted into an Alliance

with

with us; joyntly to allay the Stormes the disturbers of mankind had raised, and Quench their devouring Flames. Nay, we made it appear the Triple-League was not entred into, out of a personall kindness to the *Spaniards* but only for self preservation, and to prevent the overrunning of Christendom. Whereupon 'tis worth the while to enquire of the same parties, and desire them to inform both houses and the rest of the Nation which way the ballance of *Europe* came to be so much altered; And what hath made the *French* since the Treaty of *Aix* lose formidable than before? hath the House of *Austria* had any new accession of power? or did the Invasion of *Lorain* weaken the most *Christian King*? Could we value our selves four or five years since, by raising high Bancks against some few *French Waves*, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole *Ocean*? The *Jeopardy Europe* was supposed to be in was (most certainly) infinitely increased, And the same Hanibal is now much nearer to our Gates than ever he was, And yet we never thought our selves so secure; and whilst the Shipp of *Europe* is neere sinking, the *Caballe* (which is the Measure of their faith) no not apprehend the least danger, Happy men who can so suddenly be transformed into new Creatures! Who would not wish to have a share in your enlightening Graces?

But to the matter of fact, by the Treaty of *Aix la Chappelle* all Princes in *Christendom* were invited into the garanta for the greater security & strengthening of the agreement then made between *Spayn* and *France*. Pursuant to this (as we have said before) his Majesty sent a *Minister* to the *Protestant Princes* in *Germany* to invite them into the Garanty of the said Treaty of *Aix*, or in other words, into the Triple-League. And not long after, upon the same Grounds propositions were made to several other Princes to draw them into the same League; To which the Duke *Lorrain* (with some other that had promised to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought neer a conclusion, the most Christian King (who by that time was most manfully working under ground to destroy the Triple League, and who dreaded nothing more then a faster tying of that Gordian knot) to prevent the Association, did very fairly invade *Lorrain*, and was neer taking the Duke himself Prisoner.

In this Invasion, there are three or four things that are observable. 1. Besides the scandal of such an unjust oppression, and the indignation it ought to have raised in all Princes to see a Soveraign Prince thus hunted

ted out of his own Dominions; nothing could ever give a greater insight into the Ambitious Designes of *France*, nor discover more fully their Intensions, none but an Universal Monarch, can pretend to a right of displacing Princes, and disposing both of their lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deserve a higher resentment nor a more vigerous opposition from those that had appeared so lately the asserters of the Liberty of *Europe*. 2. This Violence was an open Breach of the *Pirenean* Treaty, and consequently of The Treaty of *Aix la Chappelle*, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And so far the Triple *League* was concerned in it. 3. It was destructive to the very end and scope of the said Treaty of *Aix*, which was to put a stop to the Progress of the *French* and to the encrease of their Power, the Addition of that fair Dukedome, being as considerable if not more then their Conquest in the *Spanish Netherlands*, And withall Part of the *Spanish* Dominions, either blocked up and Beseiged by it (as *Luxemburg*) or cut off from the rest, and all communication taken from them, as the County of *Burgundy*. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of *Lorraine* had expressed to joyn with the other Princes engaged in the Tripple *League*, was the true cause why he was thus persecuted; though some other unjust and frivolous pretences were used.

Upon all these grounds, the Duke of *Lorraine* was in good hopes the Triple *League* would protect his innocency, and not forsake *Europe* by forsaking him. And to quicken them, he sent some of his Servants to the respective *Courts* of the *Parties* Engaged. Whereupon our great Men advised his Majesty not to concern himself in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to justice, led him not to refuse his Assistance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and especially in an occasion wherin the Liberty as well as the Honour of Christendom was so far concerned. But the Ministers it seemeth, carried it against their Master, and the Duke of *Lorraines* Envoy was sent back with a Complement and many expressions of kindness, but told withall the *French* Invasion was a Torrent not to be stopped at that time. A Torrent not to be stopped at that time! And what was then the use of the Tripple *League*? what will become of all the fine speeches made in it's commendation? and was it harder to obliege the *French* King to return *Lorrain*, then to force him to restore the *French Counte*,

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as he was by the Treaty of *Aix*; in case we had been still true to our Intrest, and had been swayed by no other consideration? *Idem manens idem, semper facit idem.*

About the same time, whereas we had sent to several Princes to invite them into the *Tripple League*, the *Emperor* who might as justly have expected the same Compliment, did by a Letter to his Majesty invite himself, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of *Aix* desired to be admitted into the Garanty,

Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majesty upon whose goodness some of our great Men had not had time to work yet) assured the *Spanish Ambassador* (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his *Emperial Majesty* was so ready to come into the *League*, and told him he would cause an Instrument to be prepared in order to the said Admission. But when the resolution was taken, and Orders given for preparing the said Instrument. It was first moved that Mr. Secretary *Trevor* (who was not initiated in their holy Misteries) might not have the drawing of it though it was his proper *Province*, And then having made themselves the sole Masters of the thing, a tollerable and reasonable honest draught was first brought in, but before it was perfected, they acted their part so ingeniously (with the help of *Monsieur Colbert*) that in the end they possessed his Majesty with the opinion, that the admitting of the *Emperor*, would „ be attended with very dangerous consequences; and that in case he „ came into the *League*, his Majesty would be engaged in all his Quar- „ rels and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir *Thomas Osborne* expresses himself) into „ the farthest parts of *Germany*, as often as it should happen to be In- „ vaded by the *Great Turk*. The late Secretary *Trevor*, opposed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to satisfie his Majesty, that the Garanty of the *Triple League*, as well as of the *Treaty* of *Aix la Chapelle*, related only to the Agression and other Hostilities from either *France* or *Spain*; *Propterea* (saith the *Treaty*) by *reason of the said Allyance*. But the wary cautious men (*as well as of the greater number*) carried it, And the *Emperors* proffer was rejected.

Nay, as soon as some of our *Semi Gods*, had cut the fatal *Triple Knot*, with the *Diamond* Sword of their *Alexander*, the poor now but formerly so vaunted *Triple League*, was trampled under foot, turned into *Ridicule* and less valued then a *Ballade*: His Majesty and they

they themselves since the Treaty of *Aix*, had thought it very rational and very necessary withal, to invite other Princes into the said *League*, or in other words, into the *Garanty* of the Treaty of *Aix*; pursuant to the VII. *Article* of the said Treaty, whereby all *Kings*, *States*, and *Princes*, are invited into it. But as if they remembred neither his Majesties sending of *Envoyes* to the Princes of *Germany*, nor the words of the Treaty it self: They tell us now (in the same Printed Letter) *That the necessity of inviting all Princes into the* Triple League, *is a Maxime much in vogue with some who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reason, you will not allow them to be infalliable:* And afterwards because the *Triple League* is often mentioned, without mentioning the *Garanty* of *Aix*, (which is in truth the thing meant by it) *to say* (saith the Author) *we should invite them into the* Triple League——*That, if you mark, it is such a kind of Figure in discourse, as commonly is called a Bull.* Fidem vestram, Dij imortales.

4. We have gone yet farther then all this, And the civil applications of the *French*, and their kind entreaties, did so prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the *Triple League*, and hateing almost any thing that related unto it; we suffered an *Agent* of ours, one *Marsilly*; whom we had sent to the *Switzers* to invite them into the *Garanty* of *Aix* (and who was intercepted and taken Prisoner by the *French*, whilst he was very busie in the execution of what commands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the *Wheel* at *Paris*, although one single word from us would have saved his life. Neither did we take it ill (such is our good nature) that upon the very *Scaffold*, twenty Questions were put to him relating to his *Majesties Person*. And (in that publick and infamous Place) a strict inquiry made into the particulars of what had passed between him and the *King* of *England*, for thus was his Majesty often mentioned and named.

5. But to take off somwhat of the wonder and strangness of our neglecting, or forsaking our *Leagued* friends for the most *Christian Kings* sake, we soon shewed as much self-denyal in our own concerns and grew civilised to admiration, by our inward converse with the *Monsieurs*, whereof we'l give only three Instances.

The first is that whilst we stormed against the *Dutch*, for not promoting as far as they were bound, the coming away of some Families that

that would leave *Surinam*, we found no fault with the *French*; their keeping us above four years out of St. *Chriſtophers*, No more than with their deſtroying, in the mean while that part of the *Iſland* which belonged to his *Majeſties Subjects*. And we would have thought it a rudeneſs in us, to have preſſed too hard on his moſt *Chriſtian Majeſty* for a ſpeedy or punctual performance of his *Articles*. Nay if the *French Commanders* in thoſe parts are to be believed, there was a very good underſtanding in relation to the ſaid *Iſland*, between ſome of our Grandees and the *French Court*, as doth appear by the narrative my *Lord Willoughby* delivered to the *Council of Plantations*, and which is Entred in their Books.

The next is, that by any Ordinance of the *French Privy Council*, (which is now the *Statute Law* of that *Kingdom*) all their Sea and Land *Officers*, and *Commanders* in the *Iſlands* of *America* being ſtrictly enjoyned and required to ſecure to their Maſter the *Soveraignity* of thoſe Seas; the ſaid *Ordinances* having been brought in by a Perſon of Quality to the *Cabinet Council*, it was at firſt muſt declaimed againſt, but ſoon buried in oblivion, and put up amongſt the uſeleſs Papers, though the *French* Purſuant to it, have ſince much interrupted our *Trade*, and have proved infinitely vexatious in ſo much (as I am credibly informed) that the preſent *Governour* of *Jamaica* hath ſent word ſince his being there) that not withſtanding their old Quarrell with the *Spaniards* it would be much eaſier to keep a good Correſpondence with them then with the *French* our dear *Allies*.

And for a laſt Inſtance of ourmore then ordinary civility to the *French* ſeveral *Traders* in *London* have prepared a *Petition* to his Majeſty in Councill, to complain of the oppreſſion their Factors and Agents lay under in *France*, with a true ſtate of their Caſe and a ſhort account of their greivances, this came to the Knowledge of ſome of our *Great Miniſters*, and they having had the peruſal of them before the delivery of it, ſtopt by their *Authority* all further proſecution of the matter, and put off the ſaid *Merchants* with a promiſe they would acquaint the *French Embaſſador* with their Complaints, and ſee it ſhould be redreſſed through his means. How farr they have been incouraged in their Trade ſince that promiſe, they are beſt able to Judge, but however it was not fit the Nakedneſs of our dear Friends ſhould be thus expoſed to the view of the whole *Council-Board*.

And The foregoing particulars are more than ſufficient to ſatisfy

any impartial and understanding Reader, how farr the *French* have influenced our *Counsells*, and with all they give us a great light, and help us much to discern, whether in truth we have broken the *Triple League* (or at least let it *fall*, and *dissolve* of it self) for no other reason, but because we were constrained to fall out with the *Dutch*, and to defend our selves against their oppression as the so often cited noble *Author* would perswade us or else if it may not be said rather (and upon much better grounds) that because it was not the *French Kings Interest* the *Triple League* should subsist, we have therefore resolved to break with the *Dutch*, Thus to be subservient to the ends of his most *Christian Majesty*.

But by reason this might seem, somwhat harsh at first and be look-upon as too severe a construction of our Great mens intentions it is necessary to evidence further how industrious the *Caballe* have been, in their endeavours to make this Warr just (or to be thought so at least) after they had once resolved to make Warr.

Thus they first made a great noise of infamous *Libells*, horrid *Pictures Pillars* sett up and *Medalls* coyned; to the infinite dishonour of his *Majesties* Person and of his *Royal* Dignity, whereas to this day, none of those *Libells* or *Pictures* could be produced, And the Pillars had never no being but in the imagination of those who made it their work, to raise a Jelousie between the *Two Nations* and set *Europe* in a *Flame*, It is true there was a *Meddal* Coyned which might have been spared, but as soon as it was known in *Holland*, some exceptions were taken at it, the *Stamp* was broken to peeces, and withal all impartial men that have seen in could not discern any thing in it which could give so much offence or that looked like an affront intended to his *Majesty*.

Besides this thinking it very material to have in this as well as in the late *Warr*, if not the clamour, at least the concurrence of the *Traders*; they sent for several of them and endeavoured to draw from them some Complaints against the *Dutch* for the strengthening of the *Good cause*. Wherein it is very observable that the *Committee* of the *East India Company* being (amongst others) desired to bring in their *Greivances* they answered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the *Dutch* since the *Treaty* at *Breda* (or words to that effect) But it seemeth the Compiler of his *Majesties Declaration* was better informed, And knew more of the *Companies* concerns then their *Committee*.

But

But all this not serving the Turn, the difficulties which did arrise in the performance of the *Conditions* of the Surrender of *Suranam*, must be improved to the height, And even after *Secretary Trevor* had adjusted the matter with the *States*, and had received from them the *Orders* which were agreed upon, *Banisters* going was retarded, and Sir *John Trevors* agreement (as if he had not faithfully discharged his trust in it) submitted to the censure of the Counsel of *Plantations*, where at last the said *Banister* pleaded so well his own and *Secretary Trevor's* cause that with much ado the one was cleared, and the other dispatched away, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inserted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voyage altogether unsuccesful: But we must not forget, that, the very men who found so much fault with what Mr. *Secretary Trevor* had done were themselves satisfied with much less, before they had harkned to new *Counsells*: And were not a little Angry with *Collonel Banister* for desiring more than the *States* were willing to grant. What (was it said at that time) do you think we must make War for you: Or that We are bound to procure you whatsoever may be advantagious, to your self, and to your fellow *Planters*? *Quantum mutatus ab illo.*

Their next work and (in truth) *Great Master Peice* was the sending the *Yacht*, with *Orders* to Sayl through the *Dutch Fleet*, and require striking to his *Majesties Flag*. And I am so farr from Justifying or excusing in the least the refusal which the *Dutch Admiral* made to pay what respect was due to the *English Colours*, that the *States* themselves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new *Engagement* for preventing the like for the future, But there are several circumstances in it which are worthy of *Observation*: as, That the *Dutch-Fleet* was then at Anchor not farr from their own *Coast*, and in a Station which by many *Geographers* is accounted no part of the *British Seas*.

2. That the *Dutch* were out at that time in pursuance of the *Triple League*, and to be ready upon occasion to relieve the *Spanish Nether-Lands* which were threatned by the *French*, who were then in *March* with a considerable *Army*, and came as farr as *Dunkerk*, which one would think was a very unfit time to send out on purpose to pick a *Quarrel* with them: And the rather because we had promised the *Dutch* to set out a *Fleet* as well as they, to joyn with theirs, for the

Common ſafety. 3. That the *Penſionaire De Witt* who Governed *Holland* at that time with a more then *Miniſterial Authority* took a pride in ſtanding upon punctillioes in all things relating to *England*, which maketh the *Common Wealth* it ſelf to be leſs guilty of any diſreſpect ſhewed, either to his Majeſty, or to the Nation, through the haughtineſs and private animoſity of their *Miniſter*. And truly I muſt needs ſay, that of all the things that are laid to the ſaid *De Wits* charge, there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a *Private* underſtanding between the *French* and *Him*, then his carraige in this buſineſs, and his demurring ſo long upon the ſatisfaction, which the greateſt part of the *States* were willing to give to *England*, whilſt he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel ſought by our *Miniſters* who wanted ſom populer pretence to make *Warr*, and keep their word to the *French King*. 4. That we ſtayed ſeveral months before we demanded ſatisfaction, Leaſt if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too ſoon. 5. That when Sir *George Downing* was ſent over, he was bound by his Inſtructions not to accept of any ſatisfaction from the *Dutch* after a certain number of days, wch were preſcribed to him, which is a very irregular and unuſal way of proceeding in *Embaſſyes*, and much leſs practicable in *Holland* than any where elſe, It being impoſſible to have the *reſolutions* of their *Towns* and afterwards of their *Provinces* without a conſiderable time. 6. That this was made ſo much the more difficult by our demanding not onely the uſual ſtriking, which (though ever practiced and due to *England*) was firſt *Nationally* agreed upon, in 1654. and confirmed by the two Treaties with his *Majeſty* in 1662. and 1667. But alſo a new kind of acknowledgment of the *Soveraignity* of the *Seas* which is not mentioned in the ſaid *Treaties*. So that by joyning them both in *A memorial*, if the *Dutch* did demur upon the ſecond & ſo delayed the *Granting* of the firſt, it was a ready way for us to clamour and poſſeſs the whole *Nation*, the *Dutch* had broken their *Treaty* and refuſed to *Strike* to the *Engliſh Flagg*. 7. That after the *Dutch* had given their anſwer to the ſaid Sir *George Downings Memorials*, he refuſed to receive it, and came away without it, againſt a *ſecond Order* he had received under his *Majeſties* own hand, for which alſo he was *Committed* to the *Tower*. But not to wrong the Gentleman, we muſt alſo own, that though he had a poſitive and latter Command from his *Maſter*, which did ſo farr reſcind his Inſtructions, yet his friends

have

have whiſpered in his behalf and for his Juſtification that he had received at the ſame time Letters from ſome of our Great *Miniſters* who conjured him as he tendred his own good to follow his *Inſtructions* and keep cloſe to them. 8. Laſtly it is very obſervable that the *Dutch* having ſent by an *Expreſs*, the *Anſwer*, Sir *George Downing* would not receive, We firſt replyed it was dark obſcure and inſufficient, Upon which they ſent an *Extraordinary Embaſſador* who joyntly (with the *Legier Embaſſador*, told our *Miniſters* that his Maſters intentions and deſire being to give his Majeſty all poſſible ſatisfaction in the buſineſs of the *Flagg*, they both *Ordered* and *Impowered* him, to clear what might be obſcure or dark in their *Anſwer*, and ſupply what was inſufficient and therefore deſired them to inſtance in what they did not approve of, or did think amiſs, or elſe that they would be pleaſed to draw up themſelves after their own *Method and way* what *Article* they thought neceſſary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They Anſwered, the *States* with their *Miniſters* knew beſt how to Frame and Word their own *Anſwers*, neither could it be expected they ſhould draw up papers for them. Whereupon the *Dutch Embaſſadors* brought them a *Project* of an *Article* to be agreed upon concerning the *Flagg*, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would ſatisfy them, To which they gravely anſwered, that when they had ſined and delivered it they would tell them their mind concerning it, And the *Embaſſadors* refuſing ſtill to ſigne it, unleſs they knew before hand it was *Satisfactory*, their conference thus broke off, yet upon ſecond thoughts, the *Embaſſadors* having reſolved to ſigne the ſaid Paper, and to deliver it at a venture, they demanded a *New Conference*, which was promiſed them, and Seaven of the Clock at night appointed, on the *Sunday* after the Engagement with the *Smirna-Fleet*. But on the very ſame day leaſt the *Dutch* might comply further with us then we deſired, our *Grandees* did prevail with his *Majeſty* to call extraordinarily a *Counſel* and to have without further delay the declaration of Warr, read & approved. So that When the *Embaſſadors* came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready ſigned they were told in ſhort they came too Late.

7. I might Add as many and as conſiderable inſtances of what Arts and Policy our great Men have uſed to deceive his *Majeſty*; And to bring him by degrees into a liking of *their War*. But this matter

matter being so tickliſh and nice, That I fear I ſhould not be able to go through with it (although I took never ſo much care) without expoſing my ſelf to the cenſure of the World, and having either my intention or ſome of my expreſſions miſconſtrued. I think it much ſafer and more prudent to draw a *Curtain* over that part of the *Miniſtry* of the *Caball*, and leave their *Reputation* ſo far untouched, ſince they have had the Skill to weave it (as it were) in more then one place into that of their *Maſter*.

8. For a farther clearing of this and to ſatisfie our ſelves, as far as we are able, whether the Conſtruction we do ſeem to make of the *Carriage* and *Deſigns* of the *Caballe*, be not to partial, It will not be a miſs if we endeavour, to diſcover what their own Opinion was of it at firſt, and how far they were perſwaded themſelves, their New *Counſels* were agreeable to the *true Intereſt* of *England*, which will beſt appear by the two following particulars:

The firſt is, Their great care of not truſting with their *Miſterious Intrigues*, perſons, whoſe either quality, natural Courage, Honeſty, or experience, made them ſuſpect they would be either too inquiſitive, before they would joyn and concur with them, or elſe too reſty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon theſe fair and honeſt Grounds, they reformed their *Cabinet Counſel*; and turned at once out of the *Comittee* for *Forraign affairs*, *Prince Rupert*, the Duke of *Ormond*, the *Lord Keeper*, and the late *Secretary Trevor*; This being the firſt Secretary of *State* that was ever kept out of a Commiſſion of that *Importance*. Not to mention ſeveral other eminent and conſiderable Privy Counſellors, who till then had been Commiſſioners in all Negotiations and Treaties with *France*.

Now in caſe the *Caballe* had no *Deſigns* but what were for the honour, and the ſafety of the *Nation*, why they ſhould ſo induſtriouſly conceal it from perſons that have deſerved ſo well both from his *Majeſty*, *and from the whole Kingdome*, is what paſſeth my poor underſtanding; and whoever is able to unriddle this. *Erit mihi magnus Apollo.*

But if this be no *convincing Argument*, the next I hope will be ſomwhat plainer; And both Houſes are beſt able to judge, whether their ſitting was ſo dangerous: or how faithful thoſe *Counſelers* muſt be who could adviſe his *Majeſty* to *Prorogue* ſo often upon the *French Kings* deſire; A *Parliament* whoſe *Loyalty* and *Zeal* for their *Sove-*

raign

raign, is to be match'd in no former Age. We do not hear that either the *Cecils* or *Walsingham*, ever advised the *Queen* their *Mistress*: Not to call her great Counsel, or suffer them to meet, when she was preparing to assist the *Protestants* in *France*, or to *Protect* the *United Provinces* against *Phillip* the Second. *King James* had no reason to fear his *Parliament*, if they came together, would oppose the assistance of the *Palsgrave*. And his *Majesty* now Reigning, hath in the former War against the very same *Enemies*, had a sufficient experience of the readiness of *both Houses*, to promote as far as they are able, any design which they conceived, may tend to the honour and safety of his *Government*, and to the prosperity of his *Kingdome*. Why then should your *Greatmen* obstruct the chearful Complyance of his *Majesties* faithful Subjects. 3. Why not to call upon those whose *Assistance* was so necessary, and who never denyed it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. *Parliaments* (I speak it with due Reverence) are now and then *Peevish* things that will not be satisfied with fair Words, and pry too far into Secrets that are not to come to publick view. Our *Grandees* were afraid, if so many clear-sighted men came together; some one or other would spy out the *Snake* that lay in the *Grass*, and if their *mine* had *once* taken vent, the whole Design had miscarried. No, no, we'l do better (saith the *Cabal*) we'l be wiser than to run that hazard; we are resolved to make War, and will not be crossed in it by any *Parliamentary* Clamours. If for want of a *Parliament*, we can have no *English Subsidies*, we'l make a shift with *French Supplyes*: And if that doth not serve the turn (observe the Gradation,) we'l shut up the *Exchequer*. In the mean while the *Smyrna* and *East India Fleets*, will fall into our hands. And when we have all that Treasure; who shall dare to find fault with us.

9. Having brought the *Cabal* thus far, we must before we part, wait once more on some of them as far as *Holland*, and so take our Leave of them.

We have already given some account in the first Part of this Discourse, of the new Agreement entred into with the *French King*, by our *Plenipotentiaries*, and demonstrated the fatal consequences of the same, what followeth will clear it farther:

The wonderful *Progress* of the *French* having surprized and frighted all *Europe*; Our *Court* (who knew what slender provision was made

made for *England* in that Conqueſt) was little leſs Alarm'd than the reſt: And our Grand *Miniſters* were diſpatched in Poſt-haſte, both to the *Dutch* and to the *French*, their greateſt fear, when they went, being leaſt they ſhould come too late, And find the whole *Country* under the *French Subjection*. After their *Arrival* in the *Hague*, they begun their firſt Complements to the *States Commiſſioners*, that were ſent to wait upon them with all the *Expreſſions* imaginable, both of kindneſs to *Holland*, and of concernment and trouble to ſee the *French* ſo far advanced. There they received an account of *Monſieur de Groots* Negociation, and of the great care the *French* took of his Majeſty; which raiſed ſuch an *Indignation* in them, that nothing would ſerve their turn, but deſtroying out of hand, or at leaſt Maſtering the *French Fleet*. And from thence removing to the Prince of *Orange* his Camp; they renewed their kind proteſtations: Aſſured his *Higheneſs*, That his *Majeſties* intention had never been to give way to the Conqueſt of the *United Provinces*: The moſt *Chriſtian King* himſelf, having often times declared he onely intended to humble their *Common-wealth*, neither was it fit to ſuffer the *French* ſhould go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmoſt to bring the *French Court* to be *Satisfied* with *Maeſtricht*, and the right of keeping Gariſons in the Towns upon the *Rhyne*, that belong to the Electors of *Brandenburg* and *Collen*. And that in caſe the *French* refuſed to accept of thoſe terms, they would then take new meaſures with the *States*, and conſider joyntly of the beſt ways, to prevent the deſtruction of their *Common-wealth*, as well as the dangerous encreaſe of the *French Power*.

With theſe fair promiſes and friendly aſſurances, they proceeded on their journey to his moſt *Chriſtian Majeſty*, who was ſome few hours riding from thence; leaving behind them an infinite ſatisfaction in the minds of all Perſons, with great expectation of a *happy Change*, through their zealous interpoſition. But what may not the *Royal Eloqnence* of a moſt *Chriſtian King* doe? What, will not his *Golden Words* perſwade, after our *Grand Miniſters* had been ſome few days in the *French Army*, they found they were miſtaken before, and began to have a clearer apprehenſion of things. The *Negotiation* of *De Groote*, with the particulars imparted to them at the *Hague*, was a meer ſlander for ſo the *French Court* told them. The encreaſe of the *French Power* was not to be ſuſpected or feared; they were too *generous*

row to abuse [illegible] And therefore after they had left the Prince of *Orange* [illegible] four days without News from them, they at last sent him word, the *States* were to give satisfaction to both *Kings* joyntly [illegible] either *Crown* could or would treat seperately. This unexpected Message did infinitely surprise as well the Prince of *Orange*, as the *States*. And his *Highness* (who had full power given him by the *States* to treat and conclude with *England*) not to be held longer in suspence, answered the *Plenipotentiaries*, he desired to know what would satisfie both *Crowns*, and what their respective demands were? Whereupon they sent him the joynt *Proposals* before mentioned, together with a Coppy of the new agreement they were entred into; concerning which we'l add onely to what hath already been said, these following *Queries*:

1. Whether they were sent onely to promote the *French Conquest*; and if not how they could think it advisable, by making the Peace impossible, to force the *Dutch* (as far as in them lay to cast themselves into the Armes of the *French King*, and submit themselves to his *Domination*?

2. Whether they can deny they knew the joynt *Propositions* tendred to the *Dutch* should not be granted, since the *French* demands alone had been vnanimously rejected, & in that case, how agreeable it was to the *Interest* of *England* to make it impossible for the *Dutch* to give his *Majesty* any satisfaction.

3. Whether, they had not received, as well from the *Prince* of *Orange* as from the *States* *Commissioners* all possible Assurances of the infinite desire they had to see his *Majesty* return to his former *Amity* with them, and of their readiness to purchase it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If so how faithfully the *Plenipotentiaries*, discharged their trust in neglecting those proffers, and entring into a *New Engagement*, which was so *Prejudicial* to *England* as we have made it appear?

4. How far those that were joyned in *Commission* with them did concur with them in their Iudgement, and whether all those considerations, with many other, were not represented to them; And urged by some who had no other end, but to serve their *Master* faithfully?

5. Whether or no it was for that Reason, they opposed so fierce-

 ly,

ly, My Lord *Vicount Halifax* (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting joyntly with them though *Commissionated* in as full and as ample manner as themselves.

6. Who were those (after my *Lord Hallifax* could be kept out no longer) who went privately to the *French Camp* under several pretences, and had still *Negotiations* of their *own* on foot?

7. Whether they had Order to call the *French King*, the *King of France*, and to name him still before his *Master*, as well as to set in the *first place* the *French demands* before those of their *Majesty*; As all this was done in the Coppies of the *Agreement* they had made, and of both Kings pretensions which they sent together to the *Prince* of *Orange* by Sir *Gabriel Sylvius*, And to which we may appeale if the truth of this be doubted?

8 And Lastly how farr their Instructions, will justifie their standing, in the behalf of the *French*, upon a *Publick* Exercise of the *Roman Catholick Religion* in the *United Provinces*, the *Churches* to be divided, and the *Romish Priests* maintained out of the *Publick Revenue?* As is set down more at large in the second *Head* of the *French Demands?*

Having thus in all uprightness of heart, stated as clearly as I am able the present *Grand case* of the *Nation*, Wherein I may truly say before *God* and his *Angells*, I have Averred no one thing without *Good Vouchers*, (and such respectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear. I'le end with a few *Summary Hints* of what we have discoursed at Large, and laying in all Humility both my self and these reflections, as well at his *Majesties* as at his *Great Councill's Feet*, I begg of them to take into their Serious considerations.

1. *The Natural solid Greatness of the French Monarchy.*

2. *Their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts in all ages with the consequences of the same.*

3. *The great Encrease of their power under their Present King, both by Sea and Land.*

4. *How farr it was, not long since, thought fit to stop their Progress; And what stops were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on.*

5. *The carriage of the present* French *Court, and how they have dealt with most Princes of Europe.*

6. *How*

6. *How kindly they have uſed both his Majeſty in particular, and the whole Nation.*

7. *How true they have been to their word, and to their reiterated promiſes and other Engagements.*

8. *How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what ſecurity we have, they ſhall not be ſtill ready to do worſe.*

9. *The neceſſity of keeping a true Ballance between the European Princes.*

10. *How dangerous it is to alter that Ballance, when once ſettled on an a ſollid Baſis.*

11. *The dreadful conſequences of the Conqueſt of the United Provinces by the* French.

12. *The unpoſſibility of our Conquering them.*

13. *The Impractiableneſs or diſproportion of the ſuppoſed ſharing and diviſion of their Country with the little Advantage and benefit which at the beſt would accrew to us.*

14. *How Prejudicial amd hurtful, would, to the contrary, any poſſibility and practicable ſharing prove, the ſame being in truth no other than an abſolute* French *Conqueſt in a diſguiſe.*

15. *How deſtructive the preſent Warr muſt needs be in the end, in caſe the* Dutch *ſhall be enabled by the aſſiſtance of their Allies, to recover what they have loſt, and to come out with as conſiderable a Fleet as ours.*

16. *How conſiderable theſe Allies are and how much Chriſtian blood will be ſhed by our willful adhering to the* French.

17. *How unavoydable a breach with Spayn will be, in caſe we perſiſt in our Alliance with* France.

18. *And How fatal the conſequences of a* Spaniſh *Warr.*

19 *How much greater the danger will prove if the* French *be able to conquer as well* Germany *and* Spayn *as the* United Provinces, *and that no Confederacie of* Princes, *how great and how Powerful ſoever be a ſufficient Ballance to their Forces.*

20. *And laſtly, How faithful our Miniſters have diſcharged their Truſt in theſe great Emergences. How free they have been from dependances upon Forreign Courts. How far they have been jealous of their reputation in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit and the Reputation of the Triple League, and of their own Maſters with*

with it. Their Backwardness (not to say worse) in redressing, or at least; declaring against all the wrongs done by the French, *as well to his Majesty himself as to his Subjects. Their Industrious indeavours and various Stratagems to engage his Majesty, and the Nation in this Warr, their Engrosing all business of concernment, And concealing the most Important debates and Resolutions from his Majesties Privy Council. Nay their keeping it unseasonably from his great Council, and putting off their Sessions least they might cross their designes. Lastly the carriage of some of them in* Holland, *and the care they took of the Interest both of* England *and of the* Protestant Religion.

Now I call *Heaven* and *Earth* to record this day that I have set before you *Life* and *Death*, *Blessing* and *Cursing*; Therefore *choose Life* that both you and your Seed may *Live*.

FINIS.

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
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